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Abstract
The United States Air Force today faces the challenge of allocating development
resources to prepare for future force projection requirements. In particular, the Air
Force’s core competency of Global Attack implies a future capability that can quickly
and successfully deliver combat effects anywhere in the world with impunity.
Understanding that the future threat environment is dynamic and that continued
advancements by adversaries will likely degrade the technical superiority of today’s
weapon systems, the need arises for a planning model to direct development funding to
areas with the greatest probability of successfully defending the strike vehicle of 2035.
Examining this problem posed two distinct challenges. The first was to determine the
most likely course of Integrated Air Defense System technology through the time period
of interest--allowing for plausible disruptive technologies that generate orders-ofmagnitude improvement in capability or even change the nature of air defense systems.
The second challenge was to characterize future adversaries--requiring a broad look at
political and economic trends as presented in AF 2025, SPACECAST 2020 and other
relevant future studies. Based on these studies, threat scenarios were generated from
technical assessments of emerging technologies and evaluated using the Risk Filtering,
Ranking and Management (RFRM) technique (Haimes, 2004) to explore the most severe
threats to a future global strike air vehicle. The application of RFRM to the problem
created a coherent threat hierarchy that enables the decision maker to examine anticipated
hostile systems that may counter key U.S. strengths of stealth, speed, and high altitude
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operations.

Those threat scenarios were then evaluated using decision trees and

sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how quantitative tools can be applied to a largely
qualitative problem. Finally, this research produced an unclassified model of plausible
scenarios and a variable analysis tool that is useful today, but could also be enhanced by
the application of current intelligence data and updated technology projections in the
future.
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A FUTURE-BASED RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE SURVIVABILITY OF
LONG RANGE STRIKE SYSTEMS
1. Introduction
1.1.

Background
The Air Force is facing the challenge of determining how to best allocate

budgetary and manpower resources to prepare for the needs of future Air Force “force
projection” capabilities. In particular, the Air Force’s core competency of Global Attack
implies a future strike capability that can quickly and successfully deliver combat effects
anywhere in the world with impunity. To that end the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL),
Air Vehicles Directorate, is investigating a wide range of potential Long Range Strike
options for the United States Air Force (USAF). The first phase of the AFRL project is
to explore a mix of systems and subsystems in the context of several developed threat
scenarios that are expected for the 2025 time frame and beyond. Understanding that the
threat environment is dynamic and that new/emerging technologies may degrade/negate
current areas of US superiority, it is important to develop a model to direct research and
development funding to areas with the greatest probability of successfully employing US
strike capability in the future. The purpose of this research then is to develop a future
decision model that will illuminate the most likely future mission and threat scenarios,
characterize probable future threats to likely system vulnerabilities, and guide the
decision makers to select the most useful technologies to pursue.

1.2.

Problem Statement
The Air Force is already investing personnel and financial resources to develop

tomorrow’s weapon systems to defend the United States against tomorrow’s adversaries.

1

Without a clear development strategy to guide those efforts, the ability of the US to
achieve a truly effective global strike capability will be significantly diminished.
This problem poses two distinct challenges. The first is to determine the most
likely course of technology and its likely destination in the 2025 time period. It is not
enough to make predictions based on historical data, but analyst must also allow for
unexpected, disruptive technologies that generate orders-of-magnitude improvement in
capability or even change the very nature of modern warfare. The second challenge is to
characterize the mostly likely adversaries in the 2025 future. This requires a much
broader look at the political and economic trends in the world to determine future
environments. Will the US still drive the world agenda, or will several peers (or near
peers) arise to present a political, economic or military challenge? Will large scale wars
be prevalent or will regional conflicts, and counter terrorism likely be more common?
Whatever the future holds, the geography and technology at the disposal of our
adversaries will largely impact our Research and Development (R&D) choices. For
example, if our most likely adversaries are expected to possess the capability to field
advanced Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADs) then thought must be given to
advanced countermeasures to protect the strike vehicle. On the other hand, if our most
likely adversaries lack indigenous technical expertise to field IADs, then they might
purchase air defense capability from the commercial market. Such purchases, if acquired
and employed in piecemeal fashion (e.g., Man Portable Air Defense Systems) may not
significantly threaten US global strike vehicles. Force planners would then be allowed to
rely on incremental improvements to our current foundation technologies:
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namely

vehicles that typically operate at speeds, altitudes and stealth levels beyond the reach of
today’s best IADs.
The main areas of concern for the developers at AFRL are those capabilities that
may advance to the point that they nullify, or seriously challenge, the traditional US
strike vehicle advantages of range, speed and stealth. These same advantages also tend to
limit the use of escorts on many missions, so a future system would have to defend itself
against evolved enemy defenses. Of particular concern for understanding and modeling
future threats are the following:
1. Improved Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) detection and tracking
capabilities are becoming available worldwide.
2. Advanced threat missiles with multispectral/imaging seekers are being developed.
3. High energy lasers are quickly becoming credible weapons.
4. On board missile seekers are evolving wider off-axis lock capability.
5. Surface-to-Air Missiles are increasing in their range, speed, maneuverability, and
maximum altitude.
The challenge then is to explore likely future threat scenarios to help decision makers
determine where to focus development efforts for countermeasures. What technologies
will threaten the US strengths in the air, and how can the US mitigate the threats through
the design of an integrated strike vehicle self-defense system?

1.3.

Problem Approach
The problem with “predicting” the future is that, in an environment with I
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mperfect information, the future is inherently unpredictable with any accuracy
over long periods of time. There are simply too many variables and uncertainties to
generate a conclusive result. But it is possible to reasonably posit boundaries of a
planning space in which to predict multiple likely futures, given clear assumptions and a
rigorous methodology, and then to actively work to bring about the most favorable of the
likely alternative futures.
To develop those threat scenarios, this research will use the structure of the Risk
Filtering, Ranking and Management (RFRM) technique (Haimes, 2004) to explore the
most severe threats and vulnerabilities to future Air Force global strike systems. The
complete application of RFRM to this problem will involve examining threats from the
perspective of technical capabilities of current and anticipated hostile forces that may
counter key capabilities (e.g., stealth, hypersonic speed, etc) expected to be US strengths
in 2025. Vulnerabilities will be examined from the perspective of all points in the kill
chain to determine the unrealized weaknesses of the anticipated capabilities (e.g., radar
that detects stealth aircraft). Additionally, since the scenarios are of limited use if not put
in a relevant context with realistic projections, this study will explore the scenarios within
the frame work of several alternative futures.
Of particular use to this effort is the Air Force 2025 Project (Parnell, 1997). This
study constructed a value hierarchy for Air Force weapon systems that was presented in
the context of six possible futures. Nine years later, it is reasonable to believe that
strategic documents and facts used for creating the alternative futures may have become
more coherent since the US has been through two full Quadrennial Defense Reviews,
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suffered a violent attack on the Homeland (9-11), executed two major combat operations
(Afghanistan and Iraq), and are currently engaged in a global war on terror. There are
also now other examples of military-relevant alternative futures studies to compare with
the Air Force 2025 model.
In addition, it will be necessary to examine techniques for projecting the advance
of current technologies and allowing for the insertion of disruptive technologies as part of
the development of future threat scenarios. Since this research is structured to provide a
methodology, not generate an in depth analysis of technologies, it will require an
authoritative starting point and guidelines to project future technology threats.

Of

particularly use in this area is the National Research Council’s report on Avoiding
Surprise in an Era of Global Technology Advances (NRC, 2005). Not only does their
report help to establish an expert vision of relevant technologies (based on CIA
estimates), but it looks specifically at threats to US airpower in an urban environment.
Using this document (and others) as a foundation will help to create realistic risk
scenarios with credible likelihood and consequent variables.

1.4.

Research Scope
AFRL is tasked with developing an integrated defensive suite that will maximize

vehicle survivability in a high-threat environment of the future (approximately 20252035). According to the Air Vehicles Directorate’s project briefing, the first phase of the
development effort is meant to characterize future threats and create simulations for
planning. It is a multi-agency integrated effort that will leverage on-going and upcoming
technology development efforts to 1) collect or generate future mission and threat
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scenarios, 2) identify system functional requirements based on future scenarios, 3) collect
or produce data to characterize future threat system vulnerabilities and defensive system
capabilities, 4) characterize and evaluate alternative technology solutions for each
component of the defensive system, 5) perform system-level parametric trade studies to
identify high pay-off solutions, 6) provide guidance for future technology development,
and 7) to develop and utilize the simulation environment to demonstrate integrated
capabilities.

Additional program phases will follow, that will lead to advanced

modeling, prototyping and fielding of an operational system.
In support of the Phase I effort, this research will seek to develop a credible,
scenario-based model to help decision makers devise an R&D strategy to counter the
most likely future threats to a global strike platform. The goal is to make the model
easily adjustable (using MS Excel software) so critical values can be modified as more
detailed/reliable information becomes available over time.

1.5.

Outline
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature in the area of future prediction,

technology trends, use of scenarios for decision making, and introduces the RFRM
process.

In Chapter 3, RFRM is used to develop decision-making scenarios, and

establish the future decision space. Chapter 4 applies the methodology to match likely
future threats to R&D of key technologies to counter those threats. Finally, Chapter 5
reviews the conclusions and recommendations drawn from the Chapter 4 analysis.

2. Literature Review
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2.1.

Using Scenarios for Decision Analysis
While not in abundance, there are relevant examples of using future projections,

along with decision analysis techniques, to help guide decision makers with strategic
planning. However, past efforts, specifically with military objectives, are quite few.
The SPACECAST 2020 and AIR FORCE 2025 teams focused their efforts
generating future mission concepts and creating ideas for innovative technological
solutions. They then used sensitivity analysis to help the decision maker determine the
most robust options that would be useful across a broad spectrum of future realities. Both
efforts enlisted the aid of Department of Defense (DoD) subject matter experts to create
lists of possible future technologies (Parnell 1997, 1999) then attempted to lay them in
against future scenarios.
One of the greatest challenges with this type of uncertainty-mitigating endeavor is
to define a list of outcomes that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, and
then assign probabilities to each outcome (Parnell 1999). The problem with applying this
kind of technique to the long-range future is that there is no way to be sure that the
analyst has included all possible outcomes. Indeed, there are far too many unknowns to
quantify a solid probability of any outcome. One way to address this challenge is to
assess different multi-objective weights for each alternate future, then use those weights
to conduct a sensitivity analysis to identify the Research & Development (R&D) concepts
that have the most utility across the range of likely alternate futures (Parnell, 1999).
For both of the benchmark AF studies (SPACECAST 2020 and Air Force 2025),
the researchers considered the alternate futures to be synonymous with “scenarios.”
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However, they could have just as easily applied the analysis to individual threat scenarios
in the decision space of the respective alternative futures.

2.2.

Developing Future Scenarios
“Many people have assumed that their past experience is a fairly reliable
guide to the future…However, the pace of change now makes it clear to
thoughtful people that continuity can no longer be taken for
granted…instead of predicting what the future will be, futurists use a wide
range of methodologies to engage in structured and thoughtful speculation
about future possibilities” (Institute for Alternative Futures).
Any useful planning scenarios for the far future will need to be considered in the

context of the world in the future. For example, one set of threat scenarios is likely if the
world of the future has made broad economic and technological advances and supports a
healthy weapons market in the context of global proliferation. Conversely, a different set
of threat scenarios would be likely in a world of extreme political and economic
polarization that dampened technological advancement and stifled the global economy.
While developing a new and rich selection of future worlds, or scenario spaces, is
beyond the scope of this research, it is still important to put together a context for
scenario development.

To that end this research will investigate alternative futures

already developed by reliable sources that are targeted at roughly the same time frame
under investigation for the Air Force’s next-generation global strike vehicle
(approximately 2025-2035).
To ensure the alternative futures were developed with a sufficiently germane
paradigm, preference will be given to studies done in support of military planning. Next,
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alternative futures derived from non-DoD studies but having an aerospace flavor will be
considered.

Finally, government or credible non-government studies that address

technology, warfare and/or the political-economic state of the world will be considered.
Five examples stand out as being particularly useful for developing military threat
scenarios in the 2020-2030 time frame. The SPACECAST 2020 project was performed
by Air University (AU) in 1994 in response to a Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF)
request for a systems acquisition strategy to address the future operational space systems
of the Air Force (Parnell, 1994). The project goal was to forecast the most likely spaceoriented worlds of the future (Parnell, 1994) and project the military systems that would
be most advantageous in those worlds. The Air Force 2025 project was performed by
AU in 1997 in response to a CSAF request for a similar approach to identifying combat
systems across the entire spectrum of the Air Force combat arena. In a similar effort, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) investigated alternative futures
to help generate a viable science strategy to address the future aerospace environment.
More recently, the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 project (NIC, 2004), Mapping
the Global Future took a broader look at several economic deterministic indicators to
create global futures. Finally, the US Army, via the RAND Corporation, conducted a
futures study titled Alternate Futures and Army Force Planning (RAND, 2005) which
continued in the military theme for alternative futures development.
All five of the development efforts tended to follow a similar methodology for
devising the alternative futures.

They relied on a panel of experts in various fields

relevant to the study and employed several brainstorming and scenario building methods
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to devise the future worlds. The development also relied on extensive projections of
current situations into the future to develop alternative scenarios, and (in some cases)
devising a future world then “backcasting” to the present to discover a likely path.
What follows is a brief summary of each of the strategies, insofar as their
alternative futures are concerned, and an analysis of the common threads to discern a
useful pattern or guiding conclusions to help develop relevant threat scenarios in a future
world.

2.2.1. SPACECAST 2020 (1994)
The SPACECAST 2020 project team began by devising drivers that would shape
future environments. They initially generated a list of 60 drivers, and used affinity
diagrams and other team techniques to reduce the drivers to 3 inclusive categories:
Number of Actors with a Space Role, Will to Use Space, and Technomic Capability
(defined as the technological proliferation and growth and economic vitality of the
actors). These three drivers were then given binary values (respectively: Many or Few,
Strong or Weak, and Low or High).
This exercise produced eight alternate futures, which the team named and then
culled to what they determined were the four likeliest (highlighted in Table 1):
Spacefaring, Mad Max Inc., Rogues, and SPACECAST (considered by the team to be the
most likely of all the scenarios).

Table 1: SPACECAST 2020 Alternative Futures
No. Actors with
Space Role

Technomic
Vitality

Will to Use Space
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Scenario

1. Many

High

Strong

SPACEFARING

2. Many

High

Weak

TERRESTRIAL FOCUS

3. Many

Low

Strong

MAD MAX, INC.

4. Many

Low

Weak

BALKANIZED

5. Few

High

Strong

SPACE BARONS

6. Few

High

Weak

SPACECAST

7. Few

Low

Strong

ROGUES

8. Few

Low

Weak

FUNDAMENTALIST

2.2.2. AIR FORCE 2025 (1997)
The Air Force 2025 team used a variety of scientific and non-scientific methods
to develop their list of drivers, and then ultimately selected 3 variables that incorporated a
wide range of drivers (much like the SPACECAST 2020 effort). Those drivers included
the following, which were each given a binary value:
American Worldview: The US perspective of the world which drives its willingness and
capability to take the lead in international affairs (value settings: Domestic or Global)
ΔTeK: The ability to employ technology. It describes the rate of change in advancement
and proliferation of technology (value settings: Constrained and Exponential)
World Power Grid: Describes the sources and control of political, military, economic
and informational power throughout the world (value settings: Concentrated or
Dispersed).
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These three parameters generate eight distinct Future World Scenarios (Table 2),
from which the team selected the four which seemed most applicable for planning
because they exercised the extreme ranges of the chosen variables.

Table 2: Air Force 2025 Alternative Futures
World

American World
View

ΔTeK

World Power Grid

Name

1

Global

Exponential

Dispersed

DIGITAL
CACOPHONY

2

Global

Exponential

Concentrated

STAR TREK

3

Global

Constrained

Dispersed

GULLIVER’S
TRAVAILS

4

Global

Constrained

Concentrated

PAX AMERICANA

5

Domestic

Exponential

Dispersed

BYTE!

6

Domestic

Exponential

Concentrated

ZAIBATSU

7

Domestic

Constrained

Dispersed

HOOVERVILLE

8

Domestic

Constrained

Concentrated

KING KHAN

Digital Cacophony is a world of almost unlimited technology.
Gulliver’s Travails is a world of rampant nationalism, state and non-state
terrorism, and fluid coalitions. America’s ability to influence events is dispersed
by the vast numbers of different actors.
Zaibatsu is a world where the sovereignty of the nation-state has been diminished by
profit-seeking multinational corporations.
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King Khan is a world dominated by a foreign (Asian) superpower. The United States has
become the “United Kingdom of the Twenty-first Century.”

2.2.3. NASA Study (1997)
In the NASA study, the National Research Council developed five future world
scenarios. They began by establishing some basic economic, social and policy factors,
then refined their models by considering the role of disruptive technologies, the key
issues for aeronautics and the role NASA should take in the alternative futures. The team
established four main drivers, or dimensions; each with two distinct settings.
U.S. Economic Competitiveness:

U.S. share of internationally traded products and

services in the world economy (value setting: Strong or Weak)
Worldwide Demand for Aeronautics Products and Services: The level of demand for
aeronautics products and services related to civil, military, and access to space
applications (value settings: High Growth or Low Growth)
Threats to Global Security and/or Quality of Life: Direct threats to the health and safety
of people, and/or the stability and viability of governments, and their implications for the
United States (value settings: High Threat or Low Threat)
Global Trend in Government Participation in Society: The tendency of governments to
regulate and/or intervene in key aspects of society and the economy (value settings: High
or Low)
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Combining the various settings for the four dimensions the team generated a total
of 16 possible scenarios (Table 3). The project team then selected five of the scenarios
for further analysis based on their “potential challenges or opportunities they may hold
for aeronautics.”

Following a common practice in this type of exercise, the five

alternative futures were named to give them life in the minds of the developers: Pushing
the Envelope, Grounded, Regional Tensions, Trading Places, and Environmentally
Challenged.

Table 3: NASA's Five Development Scenarios
Scenario

US Economic
Competitiveness

Worldwide
Demand for
Aeronautics
Products and
Services

Threats to Global
Security and/or
Quality of Life

Global Trend in
Government
Participation in
Society

PUSHING THE
ENVELOPE

Strong

High Growth

Low

Low

GROUNDED

Strong

Low Growth

High

High

REGIONAL
TENSIONS

Weak

High Growth

High

High

TRADING SPACES

Weak

High Growth

Low

Low

ENVIRONMENTALLY
CHALLENGED

Weak

Low Growth

High

High

2.2.4. National Intelligence Council (NIC) 2020 Project (2004)
The NIC team, like the others, first conducted workshops and brainstorming
sessions with a broad range of experts to develop alternative futures scenarios. However,
this project was conducted over a much longer time period (more than a year as opposed
to a few months) and involved a broader range of experts and topics than in the other
studies. Admittedly, this “broadness” may seem to make the futures they developed less
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applicable to the military environment, but the extensive development process and rich
future scenarios actually appear, in some ways, to be even more relevant than the more
focused studies in exploring likely US adversaries.

The fact that this study was

completed in 2004 (as opposed to the mid/late 1990s for the more focused air and space
projects) also lends contemporary relevance to the conclusions.
Davos World: Robust economic growth through 2019 reshapes the globalization process
into a more non-western dynamic. The “Asian giants” as well as other developing states
continue to outpace most “Western” economies. Western powers must contend with job
insecurity despite the many benefits from an expanding global economy. In spite of
energy profits, the Middle East lags behind and threatens the future of globalization.
Pax Americana:

US dominance survives changes to the global political landscape.

Relationships with Europe and Asia evolve but retain a similar dynamic to today. The
United States still does the “heavy lifting” but has to struggle to “assert leadership in an
increasingly diverse, complex, and fast-paced world.”
A New Caliphate: Genesis of an emerging global movement fueled by radical religious
identity. A new Caliphate is proclaimed and manages to advance a powerful counter
ideology that has widespread appeal. It is fueled by the popularized struggles of the new
Caliph as he attempts to wrest control from traditional regimes. This situation generates
conflict and confusion within the Muslim world and outside between Muslims and the
United States, Europe, Russia and China.
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Cycle of Fear: Concerns over proliferation have increased to the point that nations have
taken large scale intrusive security measures. Proliferators find it increasingly hard to
operate, but with the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), more countries
want to arm themselves for their own protection. The draconian measures increasingly
implemented by governments to stem proliferation and guard against terrorism may have
deleterious effects on globalization.

2.2.5. Army 2025 (2005)
The US Army commissioned a RAND study to focus on the 2025 timeframe to
help determine future force makeup. The RAND team also began by defining key
drivers: Geopolitics, Economics, Demographics, Technology and the Environment.
Where the RAND study differed from the others under review was in the application of
the variables. Instead of assigning binary values, they projected three slopes for each
variable: Good (positive for US interests), Medium (neutral for US interests) and Bad
(negative for US interests). Combining these variables in a 5x3 matrix generated 15
alternative futures (Table 4, below) that covered the entire spectrum of possible futures
(Figure 1, below). The team then named each future and, through selection and merging,
ended up with the 6 most likely alternative futures:
U.S. Unipolarity: The United States remains the world’s dominant power. The other
great powers (in the team’s view: China, Russia, the European Union, and India) are
unable and unwilling to challenge the U.S.-led international order. The US will still face
threats from rogue regional and from scattered ethnic conflicts and humanitarian disasters
in the poorest parts of the developing world.
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Table 4: Army 2025 Alternative Futures Matrix

Democratic Peace: Liberal democracy and free, open markets have spread to such an
extent that they are becoming institutionalized in all of the world’s great powers (Europe,
India, China, Japan, Russia, Brazil) as well as most middle-ranking powers. Spreading
democracy has virtually eliminated the phenomenon of “rogue regional states”, so
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is not a major security issue. The
key zones of instability in the Democratic Peace world are northern Latin America, SubSaharan Africa, and parts of South Asia.
Major Competitor Rising:

A near-peer competitor to the United States emerges with

significant conventional and strategic nuclear capabilities that include a power projection
force and dedicated military space assets. Specifically, a Sino-Russian Entente forms in
2015–2018 with the goal of weakening America’s global position as well as that of its
key allies.
17

Competitive Multi-polarity: Two large powers emerge that are capable of challenging the
United States on roughly equal terms. Each of these three powers would build its own
coalition at the expense of the other two. Conflict would take the form of an ongoing
competition between fluid defensive alliances that treat small powers as pawns in the
larger game. The United States, Russia, and China each lead a major alliance system.
Transnational Web:

The nation-state has lost a substantial amount of power to

transnational actors (global corporations, criminal organizations, and terrorist networks)
many of whom use the burgeoning Internet to coordinate their actions worldwide much
more rapidly than can any national government bureaucracy.

Also envisioned is a

dramatic growth in the threat to the United States posed by radical transnational “peace
and social justice” groups, which identify the United States as an “arch-villain” standing
in the way of their drive to reshape the global order.
Chaos/Anarchy: Overpopulation, environmental degradation, and ethnic strife cause the
collapse of the nation-state in large swaths of the developing world. The power vacuum is
filled by warlords who, lacking a tax base, turn to terrorism and the smuggling of
contraband, narcotics, and weapons of mass destruction to support their regimes.

Figure 1: Army 2025 Alternative Futures Continuum
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2.2.6. Synthesis
One of the goals of alternative futures, at least in the business models, is to choose
the most desirable one and work to bring it about. This type of approach is especially
useful for the aerospace industry study. However, in the case of the military studies, the
goal is not necessarily to work toward, or bring about any particular future. Instead, the
goal is to direct technology development to adequately cover all likely mission needs of
anticipated in the future (within technical and economic constraints). Conversely, the
goal of this study is to presage the likely capabilities of likely adversaries so research
efforts can be directed to countering those capabilities which may degrade U.S. airpower
advantages. To that end, there are two archetypes of adversary that would pose different
challenges for engagement by a global, military strike capability: State Actor and NonState Actor.
The five alternative-futures studies reviewed for this research do share some
common threads that manifest as useful patterns.

For example, Mad Max Inc.

(Spacecast 2020), Zaibatsu (AF 2025,) and Grounded (NASA) all posit a future world
where multinational corporations have degraded the power of the nation state and drive a
global market of an increasing number of well equipped and financially robust actors.
Similarly, Gulliver’s Travails (AF 2025), Pax Americana (NIC 2020), and Democratic
Peace (Army 2025) all envision a world that, while at relative peace due to the influence
of strong hegemonic powers, is bubbling with unrest as multiple, low-intensity conflicts
must be policed. Table 5 shows a comparison of the five future studies.
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Table 5: Comparison of Multiple Alternative Future Predictions
SPACECAST
2020

AIR FORCE
2025

NASA

NIC
2020

ARMY
2025

Date: 1994

Date: 1996

Date: 1997

Date: 2004

Date: 2005

Drivers:

Drivers:

Drivers:

Drivers:

Drivers

Number of
Actors

American
Worldview

US Economic
Competitiveness

Many

Geopolitics

Technology

Economics

National Will

ΔTeK

Economics

Demographics

Technomic
Vitality

World Power
Grid

Worldwide Demand for
Aero Products

Technology

Threats to Global
Security / Quality of
Life

Environment

Global Trend in
Government
Participation in Society
Primary Focus:

Primary Focus:

Primary Focus:

Primary Focus:

Primary Focus:

Space
Technology

Airpower

Demand for Aerospace
Products

Political
Climate

Combat Technology

SPACE
FARING

GULLIVER’S
TRAVAILS

PUSHING THE
ENVELOPE

DAVOS
WORLD

U.S. UNIPOLARITY

ROGUES

ZAIBATSU

GROUNDED

PAX
AMERICANA

DEMOCRATIC
PEACE

MAD MAX
INC.

DIGITAL
CACOPHONY

REGIONAL
TENSIONS

A NEW
CALIPHATE

MAJOR
COMPETITOR
RISING

SPACE CAST

KING KAHN

TRADING PLACES

CYCLE OF
FEAR

COMPETITIVE
MULTIPOLARITY

ENVIRONMENTAL
CHALLENGE

TRANSNATIONAL
WEB
CHAOS/ANARCHY

When considered through the perspective of the two adversarial types of interest
(State Actors and Non-State Actors) the future world scenarios can be grouped to indicate
which type of global environment they presage (Table 6, below).

For example,

Spacefaring (Spacecast 2020) indicates several powerful and economically sound state
actors, while Digital Cacophony may predict a world with such advanced technology and
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interconnected information resources that even the least of the non-state adversaries may
be capable of posing a significant challenge to our nation’s sovereign options.

Table 6: Alternative future Predictions Sorted by Adversary
SPACECAST
2020

AIR
FORCE
2025

NASA

NIC
2020

King Kahn

Pushing the
Envelope

DAVOS
World

Trading Places

Pax
Americana

Primarily
posits a
few
powerful
State
Actors

Spacefaring

Primarily
posits
powerful
NonState
Actors

Rogues

Zaibatsu

Grounded

Mad Max Inc.

Digital
Cacophony

Environmentally
Challenged

Space Cast

Regional
Tensions

ARMY
2025

U.S. Unipolarity
Democratic Peace
Major Competitor Rising
Competitive
Multipolarity

A New
Caliphate

Transnational Web
Chaos/Anarchy

Cycle of Fear

Gulliver’s
Travails

When all scenarios are considered together, it may be possible to predict the
likelihood of the United States facing a particular type of adversary. Additionally, when
considering the driving factors that generate the alternative future worlds, it may be
feasible to predict (using a more linear approach) which entities of today (state and nonstate) would be in position to take advantage of a particular world scenario.

2.3.

Mapping Technology Trends
“While U.S. air dominance is unlikely to be jeopardized by symmetric
means,

particularly

in

the

near

term,

technology

trends

in

commercialization and globalization suggest that new types of threats may
be on the horizon.” (National Research Council, 2005)
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Inherent in their nature, all alternative-futures studies contain within them an
assumption, either implicit or explicit, of the level of technological advancement in the
future. To be useful, this assumption must be based on some reasonable prediction
methodology.

Often, these predictions are based on historic data and follow an

incremental or linear pathway to the future. Even the exponential nature of Moore’s Law
is based on an assumption (heretofore born out) that computer processing power will
continue to double every 18 months. Consequently, “The art of predicting technological
innovation is often little more than market research in mainstream scientific trends”
(Land Warfare Conference, 2002). Unfortunately, as convenient as linear projections are
to create, they cannot predict non-linear advancements or novel uses of a particular
advancement.
A 2005 National Research Council (NRC) study established that globalization and
powerful market forces, along with a relative small US investment in R&D, present a
challenge to the US and require a technology warning mechanism to protect US interests.
Of particular concern are potentially disruptive technologies which, “while not seen as a
near term threat, are viewed as one to which the United States is most vulnerable.”
Supported by a 2001 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) technology estimate, the
NRC outlined several technologies (delineated into three tiers) that may impact national
security by 2015. These technologies become even more prescient when considering the
2020-2030 time period, as they will have had more time to evolve into fieldable systems.
Higher tiers are more likely to have greater impact than lower tiers, so the three tiers may
be also be considered to have a High, Medium and Low likelihood of coming to fruition
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(in a negative way to US security). A fourth category, “other technologies considered,”
may also be considered to have a very low likelihood of impacting US security.

Figure 2: Candidate Technologies Likely to Impact National Security by 2015

In addition to general technology trends, the NRC study looked specifically at
threats to US airpower in an urban environment. Those results are particularly useful to
this research because built-up areas are more likely to have advanced IADs capability and
are also the areas best able to make use of disruptive technologies (e.g., passive bi-static
radar) when and if they become available. According to the NRC estimates, today’s
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U.S.-produced aircraft are assembled from parts largely made overseas, and U.S.
aerospace and electronics companies have, in effect, built up aerospace research,
development, and manufacturing capability in other countries by setting up overseas
research organizations—albeit for legitimate economic reasons.
The report covers several key technology areas that should be of concern to the
AFRL global strike project. For example analysts address the challenges to US radar
stealth.
“To negate U.S. radar stealth advantages directly requires the development
of radars with different and improved characteristics. For example, the
power of the radar can be increased to illuminate even small RCS targets.
Changes in frequencies and radar-emanation management can also help.
On an indirect basis, other sensors could be perfected that can precisely
track aircraft, such as improved infrared (IR) or optical sensors. All of
these require a high degree of sophistication to invent, but they can be sold
to and used by relatively unsophisticated buyers with hostile intentions.”
(NRC, 2005)

To address these types of technology threats the NRC team established systemlevel performance parameters to evaluate the foundations of new technologies to
determine how and to what degree they can challenge U.S. airpower.

One example is

their treatment of “Increased effectiveness of man-portable air defense systems
(MANPADSs).” What follows is taken from the MANPADS section of the report as an
example of the types of considerations explored and the depth of analysis applied to
several relevant technology areas.
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Increased Range and/or Reduced Signature
•Increasing range. Improving this characteristic would increase the threat
footprint; threaten mid and high-altitude aircraft, including ISR assets; and
increase the slant range so that, for example, transports that stay within an airport
perimeter would be at risk from remote launch sites.
• Low-optical-emission propulsion. Many aircraft missile countermeasure systems
use the optical emission from the missile launch to queue the defense. Thus, no
signature, no warning, no defense. Extending the definition of reduced optical
emission to include smoke helps to mask the launch location and thus increase the
tactical utility of the missile.

Enhanced Guidance, Navigation, and/or Targeting
• Multimode seekers. This improved technology would reduce or eliminate the
effectiveness of countermeasures or permit non-line-of-sight launches. In addition
to multiple optical bands (an approach currently popular), this might include
acoustic or RF cues to allow a missile launch against a target not in sight from the
launch position. With sufficient range and RF seeker performance, large radar and
battle management aircraft can be placed under threat.
• Increased accuracy guidance. The warhead size of a man-portable missile is of
the order of a kilogram. Thus, it must detonate very close to a critical location to
be effective. Increased guidance accuracy, along with any necessary increase in
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maneuverability, will improve the lethality of these small missiles, especially
against large aircraft.

Enhanced Lethality
• Autonomous launch. With sufficiently capable sensors, automated decision
making, and hardening, these small missiles can act as aerial mines, threatening
any aircraft that flies within range. Remote queuing could increase the
effectiveness of such systems.
• Expanded mission capability. By integrating relatively simple GPS guidance,
laser capability for precise geolocation, and data link capability, an adversary
could transform a MANPADS from a surface-to-air weapon into one that can also
perform precision engagement missions in the ground-to-ground role in a wide
variety of mission areas.
The NRC team then used their established methodology to evaluate the
supporting technologies that would make the new threat capability possible.

The

methodology looks at two main indicators: Accessibility and Maturity.
Accessibility addresses the ability of an adversary to gain access to and exploit a given
technology.
Level 1. Technology is available through the Internet, being a commercial off-the-shelf
item; low sophistication is required to exploit it.
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Level 2. The technology would require a small investment (hundreds of dollars to a few
hundred thousand dollars) in facilities and/or expertise.
Level 3. The technology would require a major investment (millions to billions of dollars)
in facilities and/or expertise. Level 3 would likely require a state actor.
Maturity addresses how much is known about an adversary’s intentions to exploit the
technology.
Futures. Create a technology roadmap and forecast; identify potential observables to aid
in the tracking of technological advances.
Technology Watch. Monitor (global) communications and publications for breakthroughs
and integrations.
Technology Warning. Positive observables indicate that a prototype has been achieved.
Technology Alert. An adversary has been identified and operational capability is known
to exist.
Several examples of relevant technologies are addressed and help establish
likelihood’s and consequences of individual advancements (Table 7). From these
examples, one could generate a risk matrix that would indicate the risk of technology
development and employment for use in a probabilistic decision analysis technique.
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Table 7: Technology Warning Assessment Matrix
Tech Item

Accessibility

Maturity

Consequence

Small Low-Cost Jet Engines

Level 2

Warning

Negate man-portable air defense
system (MANPADS) launch
warning; greatly extend MANPADS
range; extend unmanned aerial
vehicle range (to thousands of
kilometers) and speed.

Storable liquid propellant, micro
rocket engines

Level 3

Warning

Negate man-portable air defense
system (MANPADS) launch
warning; extend MANPADS range;
anti-satellite interceptors; micro
intercontinental ballistic missile or
launch vehicles.

Higher Performance Small rocket
engines

Level 3

Watch

Small intercontinental ballistic
missiles and space launchers

Nanoscale surface machining

Level 2

Watch

Optical/Infrared (IR) Stealth

Electronically tuned surface
coatings

Level 2

Warning

Optical/IR Stealth

Negative Index of refraction
materials

Level 2

Watch

Improved infrared, optical and RF
stealth

Low cost, uncooled, low noise
infrared detector arrays
(especially mid-wave and longwave)

Level 2

Warning

Improved capability and range in
man-portable air defense systems

Narrowband, tunable frequency
agile, imaging infrared optical
filters

Level 2

Warning

Improved capability,
countermeasure robust man-portable
air defense systems.

High-accuracy
microelectromechanical systems
(MEMS) gyros and
accelerometers

Level 3

Warning

Very Long range small unmanned
aerial vehicles, missiles and launch
vehicles.

Automated, ad hoc, cellular
phone/computer systems

Level 1

Alert

Remote queuing/targeting for manportable air defense systems and
mines; large, informal sensor and/or
computer arrays for anti-stealth

High-speed processor chips and
mega-flash memories

Level 2

Warning

Targeting and/or discrimination
algorithms

Increased energy density or slowburning energetic materials

Level 2

Watch

Extend man-portable air defense
systems range; increase lethality
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Tech Item

Accessibility

Maturity

Consequence

Very low cost Radio Frequency
(RF) proximity fuses

Level 2

Warning

Aerial mines

Increased speed digital signal
processor and processor chips

Level 3

Warning

Anti-fuse systems

Very high pulse power systems

Level 2

Warning

Non-Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse
(EMP)

Tactical Nuclear EMP

UNK

UNK

Disable AC while in flight or on the
ground

Wireless technology, frequency
modulation techniques, global
positioning system crypto capture

Jamming: Level 1

Alert

Improved, low-cost Global
Positioning System (GPS) jammers
and spoofers.

Spoofing: level 3
Watch

Multi-static systems

2.4.

Level 2

Warning

Mitigate current RF stealth
technologies

Risk Filtering Ranking and Management (RFRM)
Risk Filtering Ranking and Management (RFRM) is a method of Risk Scenario

Development created by Yacov Haimes. It is a “…modified and much-improved version
of Risk Ranking and Filtering developed for NASA in the early 1990s.” (Haimes). It is
also a specific and philosophical application of Haimes standard, 5-step risk assessment
process:
1. Risk Identification
2. Risk Modeling, Quantification and Measurement
3. Risk Evaluation
4. Risk Acceptance and Avoidance
5. Risk Management
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In RFRM, likelihood is used as a general estimation of the probability of a
scenario occurring. The likelihood estimate is based on available evidence and assigns a
probability of occurrence to each scenario (in place of the true, unknown probability of
the scenario occurring). The evidence may be objective (as in the case of historical data)
or subjective (subject matter expert opinion). Either type of evidence is valid but each
relies on different theories for analysis. The Frequentist view says that if the scenario
happens repeatedly then the question “how frequently” can be asked, and the answer can
be expressed in occurrence per unit time or frequency. On other hand, the Bayesian
method says that if the scenario is not recurrent then assignment of occurrence is
subjective in the sense that it describes a state of knowledge rather than any property of
the real world. However, it is objective in the sense that it should be independent of the
personality of the user. Users with common knowledge, analysis ability, and expertise
should assign the same probability to a particular scenario.
The 5-Step risk assessment process described by Haimes is designed to bring out
the scenarios most useful to the decision maker. The first step, Risk Identification,
answers the question “What can go wrong?” This step involves identifying risk scenarios
while taking into account the sources and nature of the likely risk. Obviously, analysis of
real world problems can produce hundreds or thousands of scenarios.

Since it is

time/resource prohibitive to perform quantitative risk analysis on all these scenarios,
Haimes developed a methodology to establish priorities among a large number of
scenarios to identify the most important contributors to risk. This methodology is the
RFRM process.
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There are eight phases to the RFRM method: Scenario Identification, Scenario
Filtering, Bicriteria Filtering and Ranking, Multicriteria Evaluation, Quantitative
Ranking, Risk Management, Safeguarding against Missing Critical Items, and
Operational Feedback. Each phase is specifically designed to help hone in on the most
critical areas for the decision maker’s attention. To illustrate the technique, an example is
provided that considers the bed down decision for an interceptor battery component of
the national missile defense system (NMD).
Phase 1:

Identifying Risk Scenarios through Hierarchical Holographic

Modeling: Identify all “success” scenarios and all “risk” scenarios. To do this Haimes
uses a technique he developed termed Hierarchical Holographic Modeling (HHM).
HHM provides multiple decompositions (perspectives or views) of a given problem.
Each of the decompositions has its own unique qualities, issues, limitations, and factors.
The result of the HHM generation process is the creation of a number of risk scenarios,
hierarchically organized into set and subsets.

Identification will probably contain

hundreds if not thousands of risk scenarios, but the final product will be a set of HHM
diagrams and a list of risk scenarios.
For the bed down example there are four head topics (see Figure 4): Physical
Infrastructure, Safety and Security, Personnel Support, and Operations and Maintenance.
Based on research, experience and expert opinion, several risk scenarios were generated
under each head topic.

The HHM shows just the title, but each scenario must be

developed and supported with real data to add value to the model. For example, under
the Operations and Maintenance head topic, one risk scenario category is titled Mission
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Conflict. One of the risk scenarios (there may be one or several in each category) posits
that a space lift mission is in terminal countdown when an enemy launches a surprise
ICBM attack. This eventuality if not properly understood and planned for could create
conflicts in range assets, command and control and public safety.

Technical and

management details of the scenario would then be developed to the point where a
decision maker could properly understand the implications and take effective action to
deal with the risk.
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Figure 3: NMD Example--HHM
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Phase 2:
Decision Making:

Scenario Filtering Based on Scope, Temporal Domain, and Level of
The risk scenarios identified in Phase 1 are filtered (at the subtopic

level) according to the responsibilities and interests of the decision maker (DM). As
previously stated the number of “subtopics” may easily be in the hundreds or thousands.
Therefore, not all these subtopics will be of immediate concern to the decision maker(s).
Typical filtering criteria for this first look center on the decision maker’s perspective and
which items are of particular relevance to him/her. This selective filtering is why the
single HHM could be of value to decision makers at several levels. The director of the
Missile Defense Agency would filter different risks than would the chief of security
forces at the bed down location. Regardless of the DM this initial filtering would ideally
produce a list of no more than 50 risk scenarios. Figure 5 shows how a sample DM
might remove (shaded) some risk categories from consideration.
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Figure 4: NMD Example--Filtered HHM

Phase 3: Bi-criteria Filtering and Ranking:

The remaining risk scenarios

identified in Phase 2 are further filtered by assigning a qualitative likelihood and
consequence to each scenario. This process uses the ordinal version of the USAF Risk
Matrix (MIL-STD 882D, US Dept of Defense, Standard Practice for System Safety). The
HHM subtopics (scenario categories) are distributed to the cells of the risk matrix. Those
subtopics falling in the low-risk boxes are filtered out and set aside for later
consideration. This phase produces a further filtered list of “risk” scenarios. Note, that
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in the example Bi-criteria Matrix (Table 7) each scenario has been given an alphanumeric
designator to allow easy reference to a master scenario list.

Table 8: NMD Example--Bicriteria Matrix

Likelihood
Effect
Catastrophic
Critical

Very Low

Low

S44
S59 S62

S2
S4

S42

S7
S56

Moderate

S46 S58
S49

High

S13
S48
S30
S47

Serious

Very High

S38

S16
S24

Moderate
Marginal

Low Risk

Moderate Risk

High Risk

Extremely
High Risk

Phase 4: Multicriteria Evaluation: In this phase, each risk scenario is evaluated
on more detailed consequence criteria. Haimes includes a list of 3 system attributes and
11 criteria. The 3 attribute categories are scored based on the ability of each risk scenario
to impact the system in the areas of: Redundancy (Ability of extra components of a
system to assume the functions of failed components), Resiliency (Ability of the system
to recover following a failure or emergency), and Robustness (Insensitivity of system
performance to external stresses). These 3 categories are broken down into 11 criteria for
detailed evaluation (Haimes, 2004):
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Undetectability refers to the absence of modes by which the initial event of a
scenario can be discovered before harm occurs.
Uncontrollability refers to the absence of control modes that make it possible to
take action or make an adjustment to prevent harm.
Multiple paths to failure indicates that there are multiple and possibly unknown
ways for the events of a scenario to harm the system, such as circumventing
safety devices, for example.
Irreversibility indicates a scenario in which the adverse condition cannot be
returned to the initial, operational (pre-event) condition.
Duration of effects indicates a scenario that would have a long duration of adverse
consequences.
Cascading effects indicates a scenario where the effects of an adverse condition
readily propagate to the other subsystems of a system, i.e., cannot be contained.
Operating environment indicates a scenario that results from external stressors.
Wear and Tear indicates a scenario that results from use, leading to degraded
performance.
HW/SW/HU/OR interfaces indicate a scenario in which the adverse outcome is
magnified by interfaces among diverse subsystems (e.g., human and hardware).
Complexity/emergent behaviors indicate a scenario in which there is a potential
for system-level behaviors that are not anticipated even with knowledge of the
components and the laws of their interactions.
Design immaturity indicates a scenario in which the adverse consequences are
related to the newness of the system design of other lack of a proven concept.

Each criterion is then scored such that a higher value indicates higher
consequence. Qualitative descriptions such as “not applicable”, “low”, “medium”, or
“high” can suffice in the place of a quantitative score. Haimes gives no preferred
methodology for assessing the overall risk level, so the analyst must give careful
consideration to the relevance and weight of each criterion for the particular scenario
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under consideration. A sampling of this analysis from the bed down example is in Table
9. The sample shows that scenario S13 has been filtered based on the severity of a failure
relative to other scenarios.

Table 9: NMD Example--Multicriteria Filtering (Partial List)
Scenario

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Launch

Det

Con

MPF

Irr

DoE

Casc

Op E

W&T

HSHOI

Com

DI

S2 - Adequate number of interceptors are not
operational to defeat incoming ICBM
threat. Results in casualties caused by ICBM
detonations.

L

M

L

H

H

L

H

L

L

M

H

L

L

M

M

M

M

H

M

M

M

M

H

M

H

L

M

H

M

H

L

M

M

M

H

M

L

L

M

M

L

L

M

L

Detection
S4 - Detection resources are not operational
which allows enemy ICBMs to intrude US
airspace without warning.
Maintenance
S7 - Maintenance issues cause an increased
number of interceptors to be unavailable,
causing the effectiveness of the system to be
decreased.
Weather
S13 - Interceptor effectiveness may be reduced
in certain types of weather.

Phase 5: Quantitative Ranking: In this phase the likelihood of each scenario is
quantified based on the totality of relevant evidence available (using Bayes’ theorem
where necessary to process the evidence items).

Calculating these quantitative

likelihoods helps to avoid miscommunication when interpreting qualitative likelihoods
(Phase 3) such as “unlikely”, “seldom”, “occasional”, “likely”, and “frequent.” When
combined with the results from Phase 4, the quantified rankings produce a cardinal
version of the Phase 3 ordinal risk matrix.
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Table 10: NMD Example--Quantified Matrix

Likelihood
Effect
Catastrophic

[0, .05)
S44
S59 S62

[.05, .1)

[.2, .7)

[.7, 1]

S2
S4
S46

S7
S56

Critical

[.1, .2)

S38

Serious

S16

Moderate
Marginal

Low Risk

Moderate Risk

High Risk

Extremely
High Risk

Phase 6: Risk Management: In this phase, the risk management options to deal
with risk scenarios are identified and compared based on the cost, benefits, and risk
reduction. From a DoD perspective, this is the phase to consider the traditional risk
handling options of Control, Transfer, Avoidance, and Acceptance.
Phase 7: Safeguarding Against Missing Critical Items:

In this phase it is

important to take stock of the progress so far. It is possible that in reducing the initial
risk scenarios to a smaller set scenarios may have filtered out that, while seeming minor
at the time, may actually become important if the risk management options developed in
Phase 6 are implemented. So Phase 7 is an opportunity to evaluate the performance of
Phase 6 options against previously filtered scenarios. The guiding principle in this phase
is the system’s intra-dependencies and interdependencies that may have been overlooked.
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Each of the remaining scenarios is examined to determine whether it is dependent upon
any filtered scenario.

If a filtered scenario is significantly impacted, then it must be

returned to the table for consideration and risk management.
Phase 8: Operational Feedback:

This final phase uses the experience and

information gained during implementation of the chosen option(s) to refine the scenario
filtering and decision processes of earlier phases. Of course, this phase is not possible on
the first iteration, but can be invaluable for adjusting assumptions when reworking the
scenarios.

2.5.

Analyzing Variables (Decision Trees and Risk Profiles)
In addition to developing and filtering scenarios, there are several decision

analysis techniques to aid in the final determination. One example of particular value to
this research is a decision analysis approach employed to consider installing anti-missile
systems on commercial aircraft (von Winterfeldt, 2006). The authors first established
relevant variables that could impact a decision maker’s choices (e.g., cost of the system,
cost of the plane, value of life, etc.). They then used open source information to establish
a reasonable minimum, maximum and base case value for each variable. Using this
information they created a logical decision tree to explore the expected economic effects
a terrorist strike w/MANPADS would have on the airline industry and U.S. economy.
Interestingly, the researchers discovered that many of the variables one might
normally consider in a decision actually had no impact on the decision outcome when
subjected to sensitivity analysis. For example, loss of life, even when valued at $10M per
person on a 400 person passenger jet, was not a significant factor in deciding whether or
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not to install the anti-missile system. Instead, the riving force turned out to be the impact
to the transportation industry and the entire U.S. economy.
This technique seems to have value for applying decision analysis to future
scenarios as well. Even though no exact values of relevant variables are available, it is
still possible to generate a range a values that most experts would agree upon. While the
wide range may, in some cases, limit the usefulness of the analysis, it may also
demonstrate that the values of some variables are irrelevant and do not merit research or
discussion. This type of focusing tool could be extremely useful when deciding where to
apply research and development resources.
In addition to demonstrating the powerful application of sensitivity analysis to an
aerospace industry problem, the authors also showed that a risk profile could present a
strong visual impression to a decision maker (Figure x, below). The visual representation
of expected equivalent cost against the probability of incurring those costs can be quickly
overlaid onto a decision maker’s risk preferences.

For example, investing in

countermeasures (CM) will most likely incur costs in to the $10B-$19B range. But not
installing the system exposes the DM to a 1 in 10 chance of incurring a $100B+
consequence.
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Figure 5: Expected Equivalent Costs vs. Probability

2.6.

Summary
There are three primary areas that will form the foundation of this research. To

create the scenario space and provide a context for threat technologies, this research
examined several germane alternative futures posited by experts over the course of five
comprehensive future world studies. To provide a framework for evaluating specific
threat technologies, the Threat Warning System of the National Intelligence Council was
established the foundation document, which will be supported by multiple secondary
sources for scenario development. Finally the Risk Filtering Ranking and Management
(RFRM) process was explored and validated as a possible technique to capture, evaluate
and select relevant threat scenarios for consideration by design teams and decision
makers working on the global strike vehicle concept for the US Air Force.
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3. Identification of Risk Scenarios
There are three elements to the process that will ultimately support this research
and aid the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) design decision strategy. The first is the
development of a Hierarchical Holographic Model (HHM) that will identify the elements
of the air vehicle that are most vulnerable to technology inspired risk scenarios. The
second element (and part of the HHM process) is the creation of a scoring mechanism to
weigh the likelihoods of each scenario within the context of an alternative future. The
final piece will be to evaluate candidate scenarios that would benefit the decision maker
through further development and analysis.
3.1.

HHM Assumptions (framing the analysis)
Like all modern weapon systems, any US Air Force global strike vehicle will

likely be designed as an integrated element of a larger “system of systems” (Figure 6)
This is relevant for two reasons. First, all of the major systems must work properly for
the strike vehicle to operate. So, for the purpose of this research, if a system is
substantially damaged, it will be considered inoperative in the scenarios developed.
Second, even though a thorough systems approach would consider external elements
beyond the strike vehicle system boundary, this research will focus solely on the area
inside the strike vehicle system boundary and on direct threats to the strike vehicle.
Consequently, Command and Control (e.g., external data links network), Logistics
Support (e.g., aerial refueling), Navigation Signals (GPS Constellation), and
communications (COMSAT), will not be considered as interdiction targets for the
enemy—even though striking these nodes could derail the mission just as effectively as
destroying the strike vehicle. Additionally, the offensive weapon systems of the strike
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vehicle will not be considered in the analysis. Even though the failure of the weapon to
successfully engage its intended target may result in mission failure, such a failure is not
relevant to the survival of the strike vehicle and developing defensive systems for that
vehicle.

COMSAT
GPS

C2

System
External
Systems

Strike Vehicle

Logistics

Ext. System

Environment
Targeting

Ext. System
Ext. System
Aerospace Environment

Figure 6: System Boundary Diagram

3.2.

Building the HHM
A basic HHM for an aircraft system should contain at least the following areas of

concern: Avionics, Propulsion, Structure, Payload, Landing Gear, Defensive Systems,
Power and Software. Likewise, the head topics for the HHM (Figure 7) should mirror
those same areas.
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Figure 7: Strike Vehicle Top Level HHM

Once these head topics are established they can be broken down into sub-areas
that have relevance to the problem under consideration (Figure 8). Ideally, each head
topic should be decomposed to a low enough level to ensure there is little or no overlap
between areas of interest and allow decision makers to filter out areas of little concern.
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Figure 8: Strike Vehicle Expanded HHM

3.3.

Initial Filtering Based on Decision Maker’s Perspective
In the case of the global strike vehicle, the AFRL (for this project) is principally

concerned with direct threats to strike vehicle survival in enemy air space. Consequently
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Flight
Control

some of these topics can be immediately truncated from the perspective of the decision
maker (Figure 9). Of particular note are the Payload system, the Landing Gear system
and the Software system. The payload (i.e. weapon load), while certainly important for
successfully completing the mission, is not a factor to consider in developing strike
vehicle survival systems.

Likewise, the landing gear—important for take off and

landing—is not a significant factor in developing threat scenarios.

Software, while

obviously important for the design and operation of the system, is not directly targetable
by projected enemy defensive systems. Though the systems controlled by the software
are certainly targets of enemy air defenses, it is the physical failure of those systems that
is of importance here, so there do not seem to be any significant ties that require the
decision maker to keep the software tree on the HHM.
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Figure 9: Strike Vehicle HHM with Initial Redactions
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3.4.

Scenario Generation from the HHM Decomposition
From this revised array of subtopics, one can develop several rudimentary

scenarios based on the general categories of threats indicated in the research. For review,
the major threat categories under consideration are Advanced Missile Systems, Directed
Energy Systems, Electromagnetic Pulse Systems, and Advanced Detection Systems.
The scenarios proposed are believed to capture the most significant impacts certain
weapons effects could have on a typical military strike aircraft. However, it is certainly
possible that flight vehicle experts may be aware of other significant areas of
vulnerability (published or unpublished) that could be used to broaden the scope of
plausible scenarios. Extremely improbable scenarios were left off the list (e.g., crew
incapacitated but vehicle otherwise fully operational), as well as those that posited
outcomes with negligible consequences (e.g., temporary disruption in voice comm. due to
weak EMP interference).

3.4.1 Avionics
S1 - Flight Avionics (EMP1): An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range
UAVs as a system of UAV-based EMP aerial mines as part of an IAD system. A nonnuclear, wide area Electro-Magnetic (EM) burst from a UAV aerial mine completely
overloads and disables the strike vehicle sensors, but flight control is unaffected.
S1a - Flight Avionics (EMP2): An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range
Surface to Air Missiles. A non-nuclear, wide area EM burst from an EMP missile
completely overloads and temporarily disables the strike vehicle flight control systems.
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S2 - Navigation (EMP1): An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range UAVs
as a system of UAV-based EMP aerial mines as part of an IAD system. A non-nuclear,
wide area Electro-Magnetic (EM) burst from a UAV aerial mine completely overloads
and disables the strike vehicle navigation systems.
S2a - Navigation (EMP2): An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range
Surface to Air Missiles. A non-nuclear, wide area EM burst from an EMP missile
completely overloads and temporarily disables the strike vehicle navigation systems.
S3 - Navigation (Conventional): An adversary employs advanced algorithms and high
speed processors in a multi-seeker missile system to increase ability to lock on to desired
target—partially negates current physical and EW defense measures. A missile warhead
with a conventional explosive detonates close enough to project shrapnel into the strike
vehicle—damaging the strike vehicle navigation systems.
S4 - Sensors (EMP1): An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range UAVs as a
system of UAV-based EMP aerial mines as part of an IAD system. A non-nuclear, wide
area Electro-Magnetic (EM) burst from a UAV aerial mine completely overloads and
disables the strike vehicle sensor systems.
S4a - Sensors (EMP2): An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range Surface to
Air Missiles. A non-nuclear, wide area EM burst from an EMP missile completely
overloads and temporarily disables the strike vehicle flight sensor systems.
S5 - Sensors (Conventional): An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range
Surface to Air Missiles. A missile warhead with a conventional explosive is diverted
from the strike vehicle by countermeasures, but still detonates close enough to the strike
vehicle to disable multiple sensors (e.g., radar, IR, etc.)
47

S6 - Communications (EMP1): An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range
UAVs as a system of UAV-based EMP aerial mines as part of an IAD system. A nonnuclear, wide area Electro-Magnetic (EM) burst from a UAV aerial mine completely
overloads and disables the strike vehicle communications systems.
S6a - Communications (EMP2): An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range
Surface to Air Missiles. A non-nuclear, wide area EM burst from an EMP missile
completely overloads and temporarily disables the strike vehicle flight communications
systems.
S7 - Communications (Conventional): An adversary employs MEMS to field very long
range Surface to Air Missiles. A missile warhead with a conventional explosive is
diverted from the strike vehicle by countermeasures, but still detonates close enough to
the strike vehicle to disable the communications array.
S8 - Data Links (EMP1): An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range UAVs
as a system of UAV-based EMP aerial mines as part of an IAD system. A non-nuclear,
wide area Electro-Magnetic (EM) burst from a UAV aerial mine completely overloads
and disables the strike vehicle flight data links.
S8a - Data Links (EMP2): An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range
Surface to Air Missiles. A non-nuclear, wide area EM burst from an EMP missile
completely overloads and temporarily disables the strike vehicle flight data links.
S9 - Data Links (Conventional): An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range
Surface to Air Missiles. A missile warhead with a conventional explosive is diverted
from the strike vehicle by countermeasures, but still detonates close enough to the strike
vehicle to disable the data links.
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S10 - Aircraft Management System (EMP1): An adversary employs MEMS to field very
long range UAVs as a system of UAV-based EMP aerial mines as part of an IAD system.
A non-nuclear, wide area Electro-Magnetic (EM) burst from a UAV aerial mine
completely overloads and disables the strike vehicle aircraft management system.
S10a - Aircraft Management System (EMP2): An adversary employs MEMS to field
very long range Surface to Air Missiles. A non-nuclear, wide area EM burst from an
EMP missile completely overloads and temporarily disables the strike vehicle aircraft
management system.
3.4.2 Propulsion
S11 - Fuel System (Conventional): An adversary employs advanced algorithms and high
speed processors in a multi-seeker missile system to increase ability to lock on to desired
target—partially negates current physical and EW defense measures. A missile warhead
with a conventional explosive detonates close enough to project shrapnel into the strike
vehicle—damaging the strike vehicle fuel system.
S12 - Fuel System (DEW): An adversary fields a long range, ground-based directed
energy weapon (400+ miles)—effectively nullifying existing threat countermeasures
designed for diverting missiles. A DEW burst (Laser) ignites the internal strike vehicle
fuel bladders, causing spontaneous combustion of the vehicle.
S13 - Engine (Conventional): An adversary fields a highly sensitive, integrated IR
detection system that can sense extremely low levels of IR radiation from strike vehicle
heat sources—effectively degrading the IR stealth features of the strike vehicle. An IR
missile with a conventional explosive locks on the strike vehicle’s engine exhaust,
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penetrates through the weakened defensive systems and effectively destroys the strike
vehicle engine.
3.4.3 Structure
S14 - Air Frame (Conventional): An adversary employs advanced algorithms and high
speed processors in a multi-seeker missile system to increase ability to lock on to desired
target—partially negates current physical and EW defense measures. A missile warhead
with conventional explosives detonates close enough to project shrapnel into the strike
vehicle—critically degrading multiple airframe components.
S15 - Control Surfaces (Conventional): An adversary employs advanced algorithms and
high speed processors in a multi-seeker missile system to increase ability to lock on to
desired target—partially negates current physical and EW defense measures. A missile
warhead with conventional explosives detonates close enough to project shrapnel into the
strike vehicle—damaging multiple flight control surfaces.
3.4.4 Defensive Systems
S16 - Flares/Chaff Damaged (Conventional): An adversary fields an integrated, multistatic radar detection system that can defeat current USAF passive RF stealth
technology—effectively degrading the passive stealth system. The adversary launches a
large salvo of SAMs in the vicinity of the strike vehicle, and at least one a missile
warhead with a conventional explosive detonates close enough to project shrapnel into
the strike vehicle—disabling the strike vehicle flare dispenser, chaff dispenser and/or EW
transmission hardware
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S17 - Flares/Chaff/ECM Degraded (Multiseeker technology): An adversary fields a long
range multi-seeker missile system powered by small jet engines that are difficult to detect
on the vehicles on-board RF/IR/Optical detection systems—effectively creating a smart,
stealthy missile that will ignore chaff, flares and even some EW.
S18 - ESM/DAS degraded (smart/stealthy missiles): An adversary employs advanced
algorithms and high speed processors in a multi-seeker missile system to increase ability
to lock on to desired target—partially negates current physical and EW defense measures.
S19 - ESM/DAS destroyed (EMP1): An adversary fields a system of UAV-based EMP
aerial mines as part of an IAD system. A non-nuclear, wide area Electro-Magnetic (EM)
burst from a UAV aerial mine completely overloads and disables the strike vehicle
electrical system.
S19a - ESM/DAS damaged (EMP2): An adversary employs MEMS to field very long
range Surface to Air Missiles. A non-nuclear, wide area EM burst from an EMP missile
completely overloads and temporarily disables the strike vehicle Defensive Aids System
(DAS).
S20 - Passive Stealth degraded (Conventional): A missile warhead with a conventional
explosive detonates close enough to project limited shrapnel into the strike vehicle—the
aircraft is unaffected except that the stealth skin of the strike vehicle is impacted,
significantly degrading its stealth properties and making it vulnerable to conventional onboard missile tracking systems.
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S21 - Passive Stealth degraded (Multi-static): An adversary fields an integrated, multistatic radar detection system that can defeat current USAF passive RF stealth
technology—effectively degrading the passive stealth system.
S21a - Passive Stealth degraded (“Multi-Static” cellular networks):

An adversary

utilizes ambient RF signals to create a virtual detection array capable of sensing vehicles
employing passive stealth systems—effectively degrading the passive stealth system.
S22 - Passive Stealth degraded (DEW): An adversary fields an airborne, medium range
directed energy weapon. The DEW (laser) manages to superheat and warp the passive
stealth skin of the strike vehicle without detection—effectively nullifying the stealth
properties and making the vehicle vulnerable to less capable IADs components.
3.4.5 Power
S23 - Electrical System (EMP): An adversary fields a system of UAV-based EMP aerial
mines as part of an IAD system. A non-nuclear, wide area Electro-Magnetic (EM) burst
from a UAV aerial mine completely overloads and disables the strike vehicle electrical
system.
3.5.

Bi-criteria Filtering
After establishing the pool of scenarios, the next step is to subject each scenario to

the bi-criteria filtering process—essentially assigning a likelihood and consequence to
each scenario to determine the potential impact each scenario outcome could have on the
strike vehicle mission. While the process sounds rudimentary, it is perhaps the most
important step for guiding the decision maker’s strategy. Additionally, since all of the
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scenarios under review are projections of possible systems in the future, it is necessary to
devise a credible means of assigning probabilities to each.
To determine the likelihood of a given scenario, this research first considers the
technical requirements.

In the National Intelligence Council’s evaluation, each

technology under consideration was determined to be of very low threat or scored
progressively as Watch, Warning or Alert—which equates nicely to an very high, high,
moderate or low requirement for technical advancement.

For example, the “alert”

technologies are practically in the field now, so an advanced technology future is not
necessarily required to bring them to fruition (though a robust economy may be
necessary). Similarly, each of the candidate technologies is scored as a level 1, 2 or 3 for
financial and resource accessibility.

According to the technology estimate, level 3

technologies would likely require the resources of a significant state actor (or extremely
powerful non-state actor), while level 2 technologies would likely be attainable within the
means of well supplied non-state actors. This being the case, there is still the requirement
to control large areas of territory for effective employment of detection systems and there
is still the overriding consideration of the technological and economic environment of the
future under consideration.
3.6.

Predicting the Future
In all five alternative futures studies examined for this research, the assumption is

made that the developed scenarios cover all possible futures--at least to the extent that the
full range of futures is revealed given a set of controlling variables. Therefore, when
assigning weights and considering alternatives, this research considers the data set at
hand to be sufficiently complete and exhaustive.
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In the NASA Study the National Academy of Sciences team did not associate a
specific likelihood with each of the projected alternative futures so one might attach a
default 1/16 chance of occurrence to each of the possible 16 scenarios. However, since
the team’s experts chose only 5 alternative futures as likely and useful for further study,
and since the entire range of futures comes from the same matrix family, it could be
argued that the remaining 11 are simply variations of the chosen 5. Therefore, for this
exercise, each of the 5 scenarios will be given a 1/5 chance of developing. Using a
similar rationale for the SPACECAST 2020, AF 2025, NIC 2020 and Army 2025 studies
gives respective probabilities of 1/4, 1/4, 1/4 and 1/6 for each of their alternative futures.
It should be noted that each of the studies relies on several drivers to determine
the alternative futures.

Presumably a more detailed probability analysis could be

constructed to address the probabilities of each individual driver. However, since those
drivers and their values are, by default, given equal weight by the study teams, a more indepth analysis would not produce more useful information—unless the goal was to adjust
those weights. As a result, this research will consider the alternative futures themselves
as a sufficient level at which to assign probabilities.

3.7.

Probability of Fertile Environments for Advanced System Fielding
Based on the assumptions made by all the alternative futures studies reviewed for

this research, and the practical considerations adopted by the Technology Warning
Assessment methodology, there are two key factors that play into the fielding of
advanced weapons systems that could conceivably compromise the US Air Force
strengths of speed, altitude and stealth: Technological capability and Economic
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capability.

The advanced capabilities and high-speed/high-altitude operating

environment of a global strike vehicle are not likely to be impinged by scattered ManPortable Air Defense Systems (MANPADs) or indeed, any piecemeal IADs. Instead,
there must be a significant development effort to field advanced detection and defense
systems. Additionally, there must be the vast economic resources available to fund the
development, fielding and operation of the systems.
Each of the futures studies under review does provide insight into the likelihood
of the proper conditions evolving to manifest credible threat systems. To begin, the types
of futures naturally aggregate into two general categories: State Actor dominated futures,
and Non-State Actor dominated futures. Neither category precludes the other, but instead
indicates that a majority of the power falls into a certain category. For example, the Mad
Max Inc. alternative future of SPACECAST 2020 posits a significant decline in the
power of the nation state as global mega-corporations evolve into powerful economic and
political leaders in the world. There will still be state actors, but the most significant
power players will be the corporations that hold the capital and technical expertise.
These actors will either replace or overwhelmingly influence existing political
authorities.
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Table 11: Break Out of State Actor/Non-State Actor Futures

Primarily
posits a few
powerful
State Actors

SPACECAST
2020

AIR FORCE 2025

Space Faring

King Kahn

Space Cast

NASA

Pushing the
Envelope

DAVOS
World

Trading Places

Pax
Americana

Regional Tensions
Primarily
posits
powerful
Non-State
Actors

Rogues

Zaibatsu

Grounded

Mad Max Inc.

Digital Cacophony

Environmentally
Challenged

Gulliver’s Travails

NIC
2020

ARMY
2025
U.S. Unipolarity
Democratic Peace
Major Competitor Rising
Competitive Multipolarity

A New
Caliphate

Transnational Web
Chaos/Anarchy

Cycle of Fear

Table 11 shows the State Actor/Non-State Actor break out of the alternative
futures in each of the studies under review.

As long as several significant factors are

taken into consideration, it may be reasonable to assume that each alternative future study
is equally significant and that each scenario within a given study is equally weighted
among its peers—thus allowing one to calculate the relative likelihood’s of a particular
future’s occurrence. To support that assumption the following should be considered. In
each of the studies, the authors made no overt effort to quantify the relative likelihoods of
included scenarios. However they did make a qualitative cut and chose to put forward
only a subset of their total possible futures for analysis. Since there did not appear to be
any real constraint on the number of alternative futures each study could develop, this
research considers the alternative futures chosen by each study to represent to total set of
likely futures for that study. Additionally, while at least one study (SPACECAST 2020)
suggested a particular alternative future as the “most likely”, it did not indicate a relative
degree of likelihood in any quantifiable way.
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Another issue that should be addressed is that at least two of the studies
(SPACECAST and AF 2025) were directly influenced by the same researcher (Parnell).
This fact would naturally detract from any calculations assuming mutual exclusivity of
the studies (as is assumed done in this research), but there are several mitigating factors
that make the assumption reasonable. First, the studies were accomplished five years
apart from each other with different goals in mind. Second, while the same principle
researcher (Parnell) was involved in both studies the composition of the expert panels,
and analysis teams were certainly a different mix of people between the two studies.
Additionally, the methodology was such that one researcher would not be able to unduly
skew the outcome. Therefore the results can be considered effectively independent for the
sake of this research.
Table 12 shows the calculation of the State Actor versus Non-State Actor
likelihoods. The result appears to show only a slight edge to the strong state dominated
futures. But there is more that can be gleaned from the data.

Table 12: Likelihood of Each Alternative Future Type
SPACECAST
2020
State
(x 1/5)
Non-State
(x 1/5)

AIR
FORCE
2025

NIC
2020

NASA

ARMY
2025

0.5

0.25

0.6

0.5

0.67

0.1

0.05

0.12

0.1

0.134

0.5

0.75

0.4

0.5

0.33

0.1

0.15

0.08

0.1

0.066

Result

0.504
0.496

Since there is another essential element to the threat equation (i.e., technology), it
is necessary to advance this method of inquiry further to uncover the probable scenarios
that would produce the requisite technology environment. In fact, since most of the
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advanced technologies under consideration require significant scientific development and
economic resources this research will be concerned only with those scenarios that are
likely to produce a fertile development environment. Table 13 indicates the alternative
futures that are indicative of high levels of technological development (H) and those that
are projected to have a more stunted development curve (L).

Table 13: Break Out of State Actor/Non-State Actor Futures with Tech Indicator
SPACECAST
2020

AIR FORCE
2025

NASA

ARMY
2025

Primarily
posits a
few
powerful
State
Actors

Space Faring (H)

King Kahn (L)

Pushing the Envelope
(H)

Primarily
posits
powerful
NonState
Actors

Rogues (L)

Zaibatsu (H)

Grounded (L)

Transnational Web (H)

Mad Max Inc.
(L)

Digital Cacophony
(H)

Environmentally
Challenged (L)

Chaos/Anarchy (L)

Space Cast (H)

Trading Places (H)
Regional Tensions (H)

U.S. Unipolarity (H)
Democratic Peace (H)
Major Competitor Rising (H)
Competitive Multipolarity (H)

Gulliver’s Travails
(L)

From this data, one can again perform a likelihood analysis for the necessary
economic and technology conditions. Table 14 shows the calculation of the High Tech
versus Low Tech likelihoods. Because the methodology for the NIC 2020 study does not
clearly indicate a consistent measure for technology or economy in its scenarios, it cannot
be included in the mix for determining technology development. The result appears to
show a significant propensity for the various alternative futures to support robust
technological development.
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Table 14: Likelihood of Each Alternative Future w/Tech Indicator
SPACECAST
2020
High Tech
(x 1/4)
Low Tech
(x 1/4)

Air Force
2025

NASA

Army
2025

0.5

0.5

0.6

0.833

0.125

0.125

0.15

0.208

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.167

0.125

0.125

0.1

0.042

Result

0.608

0.392

The relevant question then migrates to conditional likelihoods.

Given the

prerequisite of a high-technology environment to generate and field advanced weapon
systems, what is the likelihood of the design/fielding agent being a state actor and what is
the likelihood of the design/fielding agent being a non state actor? As the calculations
below indicate, a high technology world of the future is much more likely to be a state
actor dominated world than a non-state actor dominated world.

P (High Tech | State) * P (State)
P (State | High Tech) =

0.917 * 0.504
= 0.774

=
P (High Tech)

0.597

P (State) = 0.504
P (High Tech) = 0.504 (11/12) + .496 (3/11) = 0.597
P (High Tech | State) = 11/12 = 0.917

P (High Tech | Non State) * P (Non State)
P (Non State | High Tech) =

0.273 * 0.496
= 0.227

=
P (High Tech)

P (Non State) = 0.496
P (High Tech) = 0.504 (11/12) + .496 (3/11) = 0.597
P (High Tech | Non State) = 3/11 = 0.273
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0.597

Given a high likelihood of a high technology and robust economy future
(“Technomic” in the language of AF 2025) one can then evaluate the threat scenarios in
the context of the National Research Council’s (NRC) technology evaluations. Since the
NRC’s assessment study was targeted at the 2015 it is necessary to consider some
adjustments based on the type of future being considered. For example, in the world of
2025-2035 there will have been an additional 10-20 years for development projects to
progress, so it is reasonable to adjust the evaluations upward for a high “Technomic”
future. In the same way, a stunted future may indicate that the projections for 2015
would be shifted into a slower development pattern—reducing the expected maturity of
reviewed technologies.

Since this research is primarily concerned with a high

“Technomic” future, it will graduate the existing technology maturity evaluations to the
next highest level. For example, if a particular technology was evaluated as “Alert” in
the NRC study it would normally be given a “High” likelihood rating. Instead, it will be
given a “Very High” rating. Similarly, technologies that that were considered but not
originally rated at the lowest level (watch) and would have been given a “low” likelihood
will now be considered to have a “moderate” rating.
Given that that the high tech future is expected to manifest with a 60% probability
and a low tech future at 40% probability, it is clear (assuming the validity of the
calculations) that there is a fairly decent likelihood that the future will not produce the
environment required for the development of advanced threat systems.

Taking the

approach of only planning for the high tech future indicates a certain amount of riskaverse thinking. However, there are several factors that make this approach the most
logical to take:
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1) The data (as presented and understood) projects a significantly higher
likelihood of a high tech future.
2) Two of the studies used for the calculations took place before 9-11, before the
current Iraq war, and before the resurgence of the global economy following the
“dot com” collapse of the 1990’s. Therefore they may not have fully appreciated
the power of today’s state actors and the global economy.
2) Military decision makers are not prone to take unnecessary risks with national
security issues and matters of global power projection. So they would likely take
the course of covering as many bases as possible (within budget constraints).
3) Taking a risk seeking approach in this instance would require the decision
maker to take no action (or limited action) to mitigate projected threats—hardly a
prudent course for the United States in today’s political environment.

Through a similar line of thinking, there does not appear to be much utility in
pursuing calculations for other conditional probabilities (e.g., Probability of Non-State
Actors given a Low Tech future). A solid majority (60%) of the available probability
rests with the State Actor/High Tech futures, and the other risk-averse rationale apply as
well.
3.8.

Evaluation of Consequences
To evaluate consequences, the following criteria will be used. An outcome that

would result in the imminent destruction of the strike vehicle will be considered
catastrophic. An outcome that would severely impair vehicle operation but allow for
additional operation time before destruction will be considered critical. An outcome that
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would significantly degrade or disables multiple flight systems or defensive systems—but
allows continued operation will be considered serious.

An outcome that would

significantly degrade multiple vehicle systems or disables a non-flying system, but still
allow the vehicle to complete the mission at increased risk or abort the mission and return
will be considered moderate. An outcome that impacts vehicle systems (temporarily or
permanently) but still allows mission completion with near full capability will be
considered marginal.
For the bi-criteria filtering phase of the Risk Filtering Ranking and Management
(RFRM) process, this research will use the technology maturity level of the enabling
technologies to determine the likelihood of a fielded system possessing the required
capabilities to bring about the effect of the scenario (see Table 15).
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Table 15: Evaluated Scenarios
Scenario

Likelihood

Consequence

Avionics
S1 - Flight Avionics (EMP1)

High

Catastrophic

S1a - Flight Avionics (EMP2)

High

Critical

S2 - Navigation (EMP1)

High

Moderate

S2a - Navigation (EMP2)

High

Moderate

S3 - Navigation (Conventional)

Low

Moderate

S4 - Sensors (EMP1)

High

Serious

S4a - Sensors (EMP2)

High

Serious

S5 - Sensors (Conventional)

Moderate

Serious

S6 - Communications (EMP1)

High

Moderate

S6a - Communications (EMP2)

Very High

Moderate

S7 - Communications (Conventional)

Moderate

Moderate

S8 - Data Links (EMP1)

High

Moderate

S8a - Data Links (EMP2)

Very High

Moderate

S9 - Data Links (Conventional)

Low

Moderate

S10 - Aircraft Management System (EMP1)

High

Critical

S10a - Aircraft Management System (EMP2)

Very High

Critical

S11 - Fuel System (Conventional)

Low

Critical

S12 - Fuel System (DEW)

Low

Catastrophic

S13 - Engine (Conventional)

High

Catastrophic

S14 - Air Frame (Conventional)

High

Critical

S15 - Control Surfaces (Conventional)

High

Serious

Propulsion

Structure
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Scenario

Likelihood

Consequence

Defensive Systems
S16 - Flares/Chaff Damaged (Conventional)

Moderate

Serious

S17 - Flares/Chaff/ECM Degraded (Multiseeker technology)

High

Serious

S18 - ESM/DAS degraded (smart/stealthy missiles)

High

Serious

S19 - ESM/DAS destroyed (EMP1)

High

Serious

S19a - ESM/DAS damaged (EMP2)

High

Critical

S20 - Passive Stealth degraded (Conventional)

Moderate

Serious

S21 - Passive Stealth degraded (Multi-static)

High

Serious

S21a - Passive Stealth degraded (cellular networks)

High

Moderate

S22 - Passive Stealth degraded (DEW)

Low

Serious

High

Catastrophic

Power
S23 - Electrical System (EMP)

Once all the scenarios have been identified and rated on the likelihood /
consequences scale, they can be transcribed on to the risk matrix to evaluate their
severity.

As shown in Table 15, the different scenarios cover the spectrum of severity

ratings—bringing into play to next filtering step of the RFRM process. Obviously the cut
could be made at any point by the decision maker; who must consider the resources
available to address each risk scenario. However, common business practice seems to
indicate that it is reasonable to focus the risk mitigation effort and guard against over
commitment of limited resources. To that end, this research will focus the remaining
analysis on those scenarios that present either a High Risk or an Extremely High Risk as
indicated on the severity matrix.
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Table 16: Severity Matrix

Very Low

Low

Moderate

High

Catastrophic

S12

S1 S13
S23

Critical

S11

S1a S10
S14 S19a

Serious

S22

S5 S16
S20

Moderate

S3 S9

S7

S4 S4a
S15 S17 S18
S19 S21
S2 S2a S6
S8 S21a

Very High

S10a

S6a S8a

Marginal

Low Risk

Moderate Risk

High Risk

Extremely High
Risk

Making the cut at the High Risk level reduces the original 31 scenarios to a more
manageable (and urgent) list of 19 scenarios (Table 16). It is still important to maintain
the original scenarios. This practice allows for revisiting scenarios later in the process to
ensure modeling decisions have not created new vulnerabilities or increased the severity
of those scenarios previously filtered.
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Table 17: Scenarios Bi-Criteria Cut Matrix
Scenario

Likelihood

Consequence

Avionics
S1 - Flight Avionics (EMP1)

High

Catastrophic

S1a - Flight Avionics (EMP2)

High

Critical

S2 - Navigation (EMP1)

High

Moderate

S2a - Navigation (EMP2)

High

Moderate

S3 - Navigation (Conventional)

Low

Moderate

S4 - Sensors (EMP1)

High

Serious

S4a - Sensors (EMP2)

High

Serious

S5 - Sensors (Conventional)

Moderate

Serious

S6 - Communications (EMP1)

High

Moderate

S6a - Communications (EMP2)

Very High

Moderate

S7 - Communications (Conventional)

Moderate

Moderate

S8 - Data Links (EMP1)

High

Moderate

S8a - Data Links (EMP2)

Very High

Moderate

S9 - Data Links (Conventional)

Low

Moderate

S10 - Aircraft Management System (EMP1)

High

Critical

S10a - Aircraft Management System (EMP2)

Very High

Critical

S11 - Fuel System (Conventional)

Low

Critical

S12 - Fuel System (DEW)

Low

Catastrophic

S13 - Engine (Conventional)

High

Catastrophic

S14 - Air Frame (Conventional)

High

Critical

S15 - Control Surfaces (Conventional)

High

Serious

Propulsion

Structure
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Scenario

Likelihood

Consequence

Defensive Systems
S16 - Flares/Chaff Damaged (Conventional)

Moderate

Serious

S17 - Flares/Chaff/ECM Degraded (Multiseeker technology)

High

Serious

S18 - ESM/DAS degraded (smart/stealthy missiles)

High

Serious

S19 - ESM/DAS destroyed (EMP1)

High

Serious

S19a - ESM/DAS damaged (EMP2)

High

Critical

S20 - Passive Stealth degraded (Conventional)

Moderate

Serious

S21 - Passive Stealth degraded (Multi-static)

High

Serious

S21a - Passive Stealth degraded (cellular networks)

High

Moderate

S22 - Passive Stealth degraded (DEW)

Low

Serious

High

Catastrophic

Power
S23 - Electrical System (EMP)

As stated, the process thus far has produced 19 scenarios; however, further
filtering is necessary to focus limited resources on the problematic scenarios for
mitigation planning and action.

Using Haimes’ 11 criteria each of the remaining

scenarios is rated as High, Medium or Low (or Non Applicable) in each area (Table 18).
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Table 18: 11 Criteria Evaluation
S
1

Criteria

S
1a

S
2

S
2a

S
4

S
4a

S
6

S
6a

S
8

S
8a

S
10

S
10a

S
11

S
12

S
13

S
14

S
15

S
17

S
18

S
19

S
19a

S
21

S
21a

S
23

Undetectability

M

L

M

L

M

L

M

L

M

L

M

L

M

H

L

L

L

M

H

M

L

H

H

M

Uncontrollability

H

H

M

M

M

M

H

M

M

L

M

L

H

H

H

H

M

H

H

M

M

M

M

H

Multiple Failure Paths

H

H

L

L

M

M

L

L

L

L

M

M

H

H

H

H

H

M

M

H

H

M

M

H

Irreversibility

H

M

H

L

H

M

H

L

H

L

H

M

H

H

H

H

H

M

M

H

M

M

M

H

Duration of Effects

H

M

H

L

H

M

H

L

H

L

H

M

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

M

H

H

H

Cascading Effects

H

M

L

L

M

M

L

L

L

L

M

M

H

H

H

H

H

M

M

M

M

M

M

H

OpsEnvironment

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

Wear and Tear

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

HW/SWHU/OR

H

H

M

M

M

M

L

L

L

L

H

H

L

L

L

L

M

M

M

M

M

L

L

H

Complexity

H

H

H

H

H

H

M

M

M

M

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

M

M

M

M

M

M

H

Design Immaturity

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

Total L

0

1

2

5

0

1

3

6

3

7

0

2

1

1

2

2

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

Total M

3

5

5

4

7

8

4

4

5

3

6

6

3

2

2

2

4

8

7

7

8

7

7

3

Total H

7

4

3

1

3

1

3

0

2

0

4

2

6

7

6

6

5

2

3

3

1

2

2

7

Total of

27

23

21

16

23

20

20

14

19

13

24

2
0

25

26

24

24

24

22

23

23

2
0

21

2
1

27

L=1, M=2, H=3

Ideally, this process leaves the most severely mission-impacting scenarios to
analyze and address for mitigation efforts. However, since the RFRM process literature
does not provide a method for culling scenarios based on the 11 criteria, it falls to the
researcher to devise a logical selection scheme.
One approach would be to select those scenarios with the highest occurrences of
High impacts. Using 6 as the threshold would produce a list of six scenarios that have the
potential for the most extreme impact on the strike vehicle. Another technique would be
to assign a point value to each rating level (L=1, M=2, H=3) resulting in a maximum
score of 30 and a minimum score of 10 (since Design Immaturity is N/A for all
scenarios).

This technique still puts more weight on the High impact items, but also

allows Moderate and Low risk items to be considered in the evaluation (though still in a
qualitative way). The number of scenarios to be retained is simply based on where the
cut line is drawn. At a score of 24 there are 8 scenarios, while dropping the bar to 23
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raises the total 13. It should be noted that each technique may exclude scenarios included
by the other approach, so it is important to look at the complete picture—not just focus
on the calculated numbers. For this study, however, assigning points to each evaluation
level ends up including all of the scenarios that would have been included in the extreme
event approach, so this research will use the point system and draw the line at 24. Table
19 shows the final scenarios to be analyzed for the threat mitigation plan of the decision
maker.

Table 19: Scenarios Multi-Criteria Cut Matrix
Scenario

Likelihood

Consequence

S1 - Flight Avionics (EMP1)

High

Catastrophic

S10 - Aircraft Management System (EMP1)

High

Critical

S11 - Fuel System (Conventional)

Low

Critical

S12 - Fuel System (DEW)

Low

Catastrophic

S13 - Engine (Conventional)

High

Catastrophic

S14 - Air Frame (Conventional)

High

Critical

S15 - Control Surfaces (Conventional)

High

Serious

S23 - Electrical System (EMP)

High

Catastrophic

3.9.

Summary
The RFRM methodology, when combined with the alternative futures review and

technical assessments has allowed for the generation and qualitative down selection of
several threat scenarios. These scenarios, while useful in their current state, now require
further analysis and understanding to effectively assist the decision maker in making
development investments to counter likely threat technologies.
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4. Scenario Analysis
Once the number of scenarios has been filtered down to a workable group of
threats, they must be analyzed and transformed into actionable vectors to mitigate those
threats.

In the Risk Filtering Ranking and Management (RFRM) process, this is

represented as a shift in the analysis from the qualitative to the quantitative—followed by
the development of management strategies. However, since the problem under review
concerns imprecise predictions about the future state of the world, an attempt to rigidly
quantify the results would be highly speculative. Nonetheless, a qualitative analysis can
still be performed and a management strategy is still possible to guide the design effort.
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to examining the selected scenarios and
discussing mitigation options. It should be noted that though the mitigation discussions
are based on the literature in Chapter 2 (as well as additional, non-scholarly sources like
Global Security.org and the Federation of American Scientists) they are not meant to be
considered definitive, completely exhaustive or even an expert opinion. Instead, they are
meant to present a reasonable starting point and demonstrate the technique and process
that could be used to further support and develop the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL)
design effort.
In general, threat mitigation strategies should center on decreasing either the
likelihood or the consequence (or both) of a particular scenario outcome.

In each

scenario (or group of scenarios) below, the analysis will consider several, logical, opensource options to reduce the scenario severity.
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4.1.

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Threats
Scenario

Likelihood

Consequence

S1 - Flight Avionics (EMP1)

High

Catastrophic

S10 - Aircraft Management System (EMP1)

High

Critical

S23 - Electrical System (EMP)

High

Catastrophic

In

addition to

the

technical

assessments

predicting the

viability

of

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons, it is also useful to employ visualization by
aerospace technology pundits to help shape the concept space. Accordingly, and EMP
style warhead could be employed with Air-to-Air Missiles and Surface-to-Air Missiles
with varying platforms—possibly as envisioned below in the concepts portrayed by
Global Security and AF 2025:
“Providing that compact electromagnetic warheads can be built…a
number of other potential applications become viable. One is to equip an
Air-Air Missile (AAM) with such a warhead…Loss of…EW equipment,
mission computers, digital engine controls, communications and
electronic flight controls…could render the victim aircraft defenseless
against attack with conventional missiles…Area defense SAMs…could
accommodate an electromagnetic warhead comparable in size to a bomb
warhead…This has obvious implications for the electromagnetic hardness
of combat aircraft systems.” (Global Security.Org)
“[An] airship whose purpose is to serve as a platform for an aerial mine
system...[will]obtain operating ceilings of over 100,000 ft. and can remain
airborne for periods exceeding one year…The airships would be
autonomously operated via sensors and computers. It would use radar,
infrared, or other devices to detect enemy air activity; upon which air to
air missiles would automatically engage the enemy. A fleet of such craft
could be used as aerial mines to make enemy airspace unusable…”(Air
Force 2025)
Likelihood Mitigation: The likelihood of experiencing a negative outcome can logically
be reduced in several ways—each promising improvement, but at a cost.
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1) Harden critical vehicle systems against the EMP threat. The required degree of
hardening (i.e., EMP shielding) would depend on the anticipated intensity of the
EMP, which is a factor of the pulse strength and the distance to the source. In
general, the greater the shielding capacity, the greater will be the addition to
vehicle weight. Increased vehicle weight will detract from vehicle performance
(to varying degrees depending on design decisions) by reducing the maximum
payload, reducing maximum range or degrading other flight characteristics (e.g.,
Radio Frequency (RF) stealth cross section).
2) Add enhanced sensors to the strike vehicle to improve chances of detecting small,
stealthy aerial mines and either avoiding their area of effect or destroying their
operating platform. Additional/more capable sensors will likely add to vehicle
weight and modify the vehicle shape which presents the same concerns as above.
If the “avoidance” tactic is chosen the vehicle will require additional range
capability to ensure reaching the target after evasive maneuvers. If the “destroy
the threat” tactic is employed the addition of an air-to-air strike capability would
have to be added to the vehicle (kinetic or directed energy) which adds to vehicle
weight and complexity and reduces the vehicle’s strategic strike capacity.
3) Render the enemy defensive net ineffective by avoiding detection through
enhancement of the stealth features of the US Air Force strike vehicle. This is a
highly classified area of inquiry, but some general principles can be applied for
discussion in this non-classified thesis. First, all things being equal (geometry,
composition, etc.) a smaller vehicle will present a smaller radar cross section (in
all wavelengths). Second, research could focus on increasing the effectiveness of
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current radar absorbing material.

Finally, recent research on active stealth

technology (microwave frequency) may indicate a fruitful area of investment for
multi-spectral active stealth technology.
Consequence Mitigation: The consequences of temporarily losing flight control are
difficult to mitigate, as they would typically lead to the imminent demise of the air
vehicle. However, there may be some design features that would allow the air vehicle to
default into a stable flight configuration in the event of the loss of coherent control
signals. While the lack of maneuverability may increase the risk of successful assault by
other enemy weapons, it would also allow for the possibility of recovering vehicle control
and either continuing the mission or retrieving the vehicle intact.

4.2.

Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) Threats
Scenario

Likelihood

S12 - Fuel System (DEW)

Low

Consequence
Catastrophic

While only one of the directed energy weapon scenarios made it into the final list
for evaluation, the potentially catastrophic effects make this a likely future weapon to be
concerned with—especially since there is no defense against the threat today. The most
visible scenario mirrors US Air Force efforts with the Airborne Laser (ABL) project,
though ground-based Integrated Air Defense systems (IADs) projects are certainly
feasible considering the greater energy reserves available for a ground based system. The
ABL is designed to destroy enemy missiles in the boost phase but is equally viable as an
anti-aircraft weapon.
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“The ABL is designed to detect and destroy theatre ballistic missiles in the
powered boost phase of flight immediately after missile launch. The
aircraft loiters at an altitude of 40,000 feet. Missile launch is detected by a
reconnaissance system such as satellite or Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS) aircraft and threat data is transmitted to the ABL
aircraft by Link 16 communications. A suite of infrared, wide-field
telescopes installed along the length of the aircraft's fuselage detects the
missile plume at ranges up to several hundred km...Where the missile
carries liquid fuel, the laser can heat a spot on the missile's fuel tank,
causing an increase in internal pressure resulting in catastrophic
failure…” (Air Force Technology.com)

Likelihood Mitigation
1) Shield the surface of the vulnerable area with a highly reflective coating.
Unfortunately, that would also likely increase the radar cross section of the
vehicle unless material was developed to be transparent to RF but opaque to
visible light.
2) Construct the fuel storage tanks to withstand very high external temperatures and
to radiate the energy back to the environment (may increase the IR signature).
3) Add sensors to the vehicle to detect thermal spikes and develop in-flight
maneuvers to reduce the laser dwell time over any specific point on the vehicle.
Consequence Mitigation
1) Design fuel bladders to be able to release pressure without exploding (would still
result in loss of fuel and reduced mission range)
2) Design the strike vehicle with a favorable glide ratio (and emergency weight
management system to drop unneeded gear) so that a high altitude mission that
lost its fuel source could still return to neutral territory.
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4.3.

Conventional Threats
The “conventional” threat scenarios are labeled as such because the agent of

destruction is a simple, kinetic warhead on a standard missile (albeit with advanced
materials, propulsion and electronics on board). Since that is the assumed case, the
reduction in likelihood will be similar in many respects—illuminated by the following
visual description.
“A broad-band multimode seeker system for a missile includes a wide
band phased array transmitter/receiver unit incorporating a wafer scale
phased array device with a bandwidth of about 2 GHz to 35 GHz. A
multimode intermediate frequency unit selectively generates radar and
jamming waveforms and measures parameters of reflected radar and
external emissions of RF energy. A guidance processor manages the front
end assets for selective active or semi active radar searching and tracking,
and simultaneous searching for, tracking of, homing on, and applying a
selection of electronic countermeasures to, multiple defensive radars.
Confirmation of an assigned target is made through correlation of
received RF signals with libraries of expected defensive system
parameters and high resolution target profiles and preloaded target
geographical coordinates.” (Freepatentsonline.com)

Scenario

Likelihood
Low

S11 - Fuel System (Conventional)

Consequence
Critical

Likelihood Mitigation
1) Install on-board, active, anti-missile system (e.g., small laser to blind missile
seeker hardware). This option will add extra weight (for the sensor hardware and
the weapon itself), increase the overall system complexity and would require
additional design to incorporate into the stealth exterior.
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2) Invest design dollars to reduce RF and IR signatures to minimize chance of
detection and weapons lock.
3) Continue development on multi-spectrum jammers to divert the incoming
missiles.
4) Increase the strike vehicle operational ceiling to allow more time for hostile
missile detection and require more energy expenditure from the threat systems.
Consequence Mitigation
1) Design fuel bladders to be able to release pressure without exploding. This option
would still result in loss of fuel which would reduce mission range, but could
allow for strikes on secondary targets and for the recovery of the vehicle.
2) Design the fuel system with independently controllable, redundant fuel flow
systems. While this option obviously adds to vehicle weight and complexity, it
would also increase the vehicle survivability in the case of minimal vehicle
damage.
3) Design the strike vehicle with a favorable glide ratio (and an emergency weight
management system to drop unneeded gear) so that a high altitude mission that
lost its fuel source could still return to neutral territory.

Scenario

Likelihood
High

S13 - Engine (Conventional)
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Consequence
Catastrophic

Likelihood Mitigation
1) Install on-board, active, anti-missile system (e.g., small laser to blind missile
seeker hardware). This option will add extra weight (for the sensor hardware and
the weapon itself), increase the overall system complexity and would require
additional design to incorporate into the stealth exterior.
2) Employ design concepts to further reduce the IR signature of the vehicle engine
exhaust to decrease chances of a fatal engine impact (increased vehicle
complexity).
3) Invest design dollars to reduce RF and IR signatures to minimize chance of
detection and weapons lock.
4) Continue development on multi-spectrum jammers to divert the incoming
missiles.
5) Increase the strike vehicle operational ceiling to allow more time for hostile
missile detection and require more energy expenditure from the threat systems.
Consequence Mitigation
1) Design the strike vehicle with multiple engines sufficiently separated on the
airframe to allow continued flight operations without one engine and with some
structural damage (e.g., A-10 robust design). This would certainly add to the
vehicle complexity, size and weight—which equate to performance tradeoffs.

Scenario

Likelihood
High

S14 - Air Frame (Conventional)
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Consequence
Critical

Likelihood Mitigation
1) Install on-board, active, anti-missile system (e.g., small laser to blind missile
seeker hardware). This option will add extra weight (for the sensor hardware and
the weapon itself), increase the overall system complexity and would require
additional design to incorporate into the stealth exterior.
2) Invest design dollars to reduce RF and IR signatures to minimize chance of
detection and weapons lock.
3) Continue development on multi-spectrum jammers to divert the incoming
missiles.
4) Increase the strike vehicle operational ceiling to allow more time for hostile
missile detection and require more energy expenditure from the threat systems.
Consequence Mitigation
1) Build in redundant structures to support the air frame (adds to vehicle weight).

Scenario

Likelihood
High

S15 - Control Surfaces (Conventional)

Consequence
Serious

Likelihood Mitigation
1) Install on-board, active, anti-missile system (e.g., small laser to blind missile
seeker hardware). This option will add extra weight (for the sensor hardware and
the weapon itself), increase the overall system complexity and would require
additional design to incorporate into the stealth exterior.
2) Reduce RF and IR signatures to minimize chance of detection and weapons lock
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3) Continue development on multi-spectrum jammers to divert the incoming
missiles.
4) Increase the strike vehicle operational ceiling to allow more time for hostile
missile detection and require more energy expenditure from the threat systems.
Consequence Mitigation
1) Design robust control surfaces to allow for basic flight maneuvering even with
heavy damage (will likely add to vehicle weight)
2) Design an inherently stable vehicle that requires minimal control surface input.
While a more stable design would reduce maneuverability, this vehicle is not
intended for air-to-air combat
Clearly there are multiple mitigation concepts available for each scenario, and
they all require trade offs in design decisions and technology investment. Once all of the
mitigation concepts have been laid out and quantified in terms of cost, schedule, and
performance parameters it is possible to construct a decision tree that would allow the
decision maker to focus on the most “bang-for-buck” research solutions.

4.4.

Modeling a Decision Tool
In this research, it is clear additional technical data is required on each threat

concept to make informed decisions. However, it is still possible to develop a decision
tool for this problem using reasonable ranges for specific technical values and cost
considerations. To demonstrate how the technique could be applied to analyze a decision
maker’s options, this research will develop a decision model to decide whether or not to
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invest in an onboard, anti-missile directed energy weapon (AMDEW)--since this type of
system would be useful in countering many of the threat scenarios under consideration.
This same process could be used for EMP hardening, adding redundant control structures,
investing in “active stealth” research, etc.
Since this research focused on developing threat scenarios, not counter-threat
systems, the decision model will rely on open source information, analogy, personal
experience of the author and transparent, reasonable logic to establish quantitative ranges
for evaluating an AMDEW. The values can be easily changed by decision makers to
reflect more exact information or personal beliefs, and a sensitivity analysis will be
performed to help determine which variables merit research toward greater accuracy.
To begin, it is useful to select existing systems that are analogous to the concept
system under consideration in order to model the GSV parameters. Fortunately, a form
of anti-missile directed energy weapon system is already in existence today. Northrop
Grumman’s “Nemesis” system is a directional infrared countermeasure (DIRCM) system
currently being tested on commercial airlines in the United States.

Realizing it is

designed specifically for shoulder-fired, IR-seeker missiles and understanding that a
DEW system on a strike vehicle would present a host of unique challenges in
development, procurement and maintenance, the DIRCM system still provides the closest
analogy to establish the basic decision model.
In developing the decision tree, it is necessary to create logical pathways that will
include every significant decision point (see Figure 10). In this analysis, the first point
decides whether or not to pursue the AMDEW system. Following the status quo route
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(no AMDEW) then takes us to the likelihood of an IADS launch. Considering that the
strike vehicle would be flying a combat mission deep in enemy territory, and given that
the GSV is detected, and given that the enemy possesses the advanced capability missile
discussed in the threat scenario, it is likely that enemy forces would launch. So for the
base case, this research will use a 0.90 probability situated between a 0.75 min and a 1.0
max.

GSV Destroyed
t

AMDEW Allows “Hit”
Not Diverted by CM
IADs Launch
Add AMDEW

(1-d)*i

1-c
Diverted by CM

GSV Recovered

AMDEW Causes “Miss”

1-t

1-(1-a)*h
GSV Destroyed

No IADs Launch

c

Anti-Missile Directed Energy Weapon

IADs Launch
i

Not Diverted by CM
1-c
Diverted by CM

No IADs Launch
1-i

t

IADs Missile “Hits”

1-(1-d)*i

Don’t Add AML

(1-a)*h

h

GSV Recovered

Missile “Misses”
1-h

c

Figure 10: Model Decision Tree

Given that the launch does occur, the next juncture involves the suite of
countermeasures employed today: Flares, Chaff, and ECM of various capabilities. These
are exactly the types of countermeasures that would be penetrable by a multi-mode
seeker missile with advance on-board processors as envisioned by the threat scenarios
developed in Chapter 3. While there are certainly multiple technical specifications that
would go into developing probabilities of this node, it may be just as effective to give a
credible range. So for the base case the existing genre of countermeasures will be
considered 30% effective in deflecting an advanced missile barrage. By setting the min
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1-t

at 15% and the max at 50% a good range of capability can be established (given the
assumptions made about the threat).
Given that the conventional countermeasures fail to divert the missile(s) the next
node posits the likelihood of a hit. Since failed countermeasures are effectively the same
as no countermeasures, this hit probability assumes optimum conditions for the IADs
missiles. Certainly there are other factors that could be considered (e.g., weather, look
angle, etc.) but unimpeded missiles are pretty accurate in most conditions—even today—
so the base case will be set at 0.8 to hit. The max will range up to 1.0 with the min being
at least a .5 chance of hitting. It should also be noted that a “hit” does not necessarily
indicate that the warhead physically struck the air vehicle. It could mean shrapnel from
the warhead, overpressure damage from the explosion, or even EMP damage (depending
on the warhead type). This distinction allows for multiple possibilities following a hit
(depending on consequence mitigation), though our initial model will only consider two.
Given that the vehicle is “hit” there are two general possibilities that this model
will consider: 1) The vehicle is effectively destroyed, or 2) the vehicle is able to retreat
and is recovered by friendly forces. In either case this model assumes that a hit vehicle
will result in mission failure. It is certainly possible to expand the model to include a “hit
but still mission capable” option if consequence mitigation measures are included in the
design assumptions along with associated probabilities of success.
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Table 20: Decision Tree Variable Matrix
Probabilities
i- enemy IADS launch when AF Strike Vehicle Detected
c - countermeasures (EW, Flair, Chaff, Sensors, etc.) engage and interdict
advanced missile
h - hit (without any CM)
t - catastrophic consequences (resulting from a hit) that lead to loss of the
GSV
Effectiveness
d - deterrence effect on enemy launch decision
a - effectiveness of AMDEW (given that missile is detected and tracked)

Min
0.75

Base
0.90

Max
1.00

0.15
0.50

0.30
0.80

0.50
1.00

0.70
Min
0.00
0.75

0.80
Base
0.25
0.90

0.90
Max
0.50
1.00

The next phase of the analysis requires the creation of an estimate for the cost of
developing and fielding the AMDEW system. This estimate will provide a measure by
which to evaluate a trade between the competing values of cost and vehicle survivability.
Open sources posit that it would cost about $10B to procure enough systems to outfit the
6,500 planes (1 system per plane) of the commercial passenger (and freight) industries
with a DIRCM-like system.

Additionally, estimates predict annual operations and

maintenance costs of the integrated system would approach $2.5B (von Winterfeldt,
2006, and RAND, 2005). A simple, mathematical decomposition shows that the effective
unit cost would be in the neighborhood of $1.5M (5.8M) per aircraft with an annual, per
unit O&M cost of approximately $385K. R&D costs are not included in this estimate
since it is not anticipated that the GSV program would not bear the weight of the
development effort. Much of the R&D is ongoing today on similar systems, any future
system would likely have its development costs amortized over a larger family of air
vehicles.
Using a number of 100 global strike vehicles (GSV) gives an estimate of $150M
($1.5M x 100 vehicles) for system development, procurement, and deployment--and an
estimate of $38.5M annually for fleet wide O&M of the system ($385M for the 10 year
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vehicle life).

At first glance, these numbers may seem high (especially the O&M

figures), but the analysis will allow for a range of values and provide a means to insert
more accurate data as it becomes available.
For the unit cost of the strike vehicle, the best reference systems may be the F35
and F22 (once considered with a strike/bomber variant). Open source estimates place the
unit cost of the F35 at around $30M, and the unit cost of the F22 at around $100M.
Using those ranges as the upper and lower bound, the base case for the estimated GSV
unit cost is established at the median value of $65M.
The crew size in modern, tactical-strike aircraft is typically one (e.g., F16, F117).
But the crew size for a long-range, extended-duration, deep-strike aircraft is typically
more than one (e.g., F111, B1, and B2), and it is also possible that the vehicle could be
configured as an unmanned vehicle. For the base case, this research assumes two crew
members. This consideration will become a factor when value of life is factored as part
of the total economic equation.
In calculating the value of a human life there is no accepted answer, and any
discussion is invariably fraught with emotional pleas and ambiguous criteria. However,
considering the inherently dangerous nature of military combat operations, it is
reasonable to approach the question from a more calculated, resource loss perspective.
At the minimum, the military would likely consider each crew member to be worth the
cost of his/her accession and training. So using a figure of $2.0 million to account for the
recruiting, training and fielding of a pilot would seem to be a reasonable minimum value.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, losing an experienced pilot (e.g., Lt Col) who has
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20+ years of service represents a much greater investment in training and development,
as well as a the value of experience, command potential, and (among other factors) the
automatic survivors benefit plan payout (roughly equivalent to a $350K lump sum
funding of an annuity for a Lt Col’s survivors). So the high end is assumed to be $15M
with $5 M for the base case.
For the cost of the mission weapons load this research assumes the vehicle is
armed with a variant of today’s Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) which is supposed to retail
for under $40K. The base case is assumed to be 8 SDBs ($320K) and the range up to 12
($480K) for the max and down to 6 ($240K) for the min.
The Value of the Mission must also be considered when calculating the impact of
a vehicle loss. This number is certainly difficult to pin down—especially in terms of
defining a dollar value to compare with other cost figures. To complicate the problem
even more, every mission is different and the political, military and economic
consequences may be far-reaching—especially considering that the GSV would be used
to impart strategic level combat effects. Assuming that decision makers would like to
maintain at least a 95% mission success rate one could say that a DM is willing to accept
a 5% loss rate (Obviously, this number can vary based on the risk preferences of the DM:
risk averse, risk neutral, or risk seeking). So at the very low end the value of the mission
should at least be greater than 5% of the cost of the vehicle fleet and crew roster. This
research constrains the high end to some number that explicitly impacts the decision
maker in the Air Force.

Considering that vehicle losses would likely impugn the

reputation of the strike vehicle capabilities (e.g., F117 shot down by low tech air
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defenses) and even the entire global strike vehicle program—it may be reasonable to use
some portion of the entire strike vehicle program cost as the value of the mission on the
high end. Presumably, to precipitate a serious program impact, the vehicle failures must
take place in operational strike vehicles fairly early in the production life. All of the
R&D and initial procurement costs would have already been expended but the remaining
production run of 50% of the 100 vehicle fleet could be at stake.

So the high end

mission value cost is the unit cost (low end estimate of $30M) of a GSV times 50
vehicles ($1.5B). The base case is assumed to be 50% of the max case ($750M).

Table 21: Expected Value of Consequences Matrix
Consequences
VOL
FAT
CGSV
CPAYLOAD
CAMDEW
VOM
CREPAIRS

Min
Value of Life (Millions)
Fatalities given loss of vehicle
Cost of the GSV (Millions)
Cost of the Payload (Millions)
Cost of Antimissile System (Millions)
Value of the Mission (Millions)
Cost of Vehicle Repairs (Millions)

$2.00
1
$30.00
$0.24
$100.00
$160.00
$0.50

Base
$5.00
2
$65.00
$0.32
$150.00
$750.00
$5.00

Max
$15.00
2
$100.00
$0.48
$200.00
$1,500.00
$10.00

Based on the values developed and outlined in Table 21, the expected cost for
each termination node can be calculated using the following expected cost equations:
For a destroyed vehicle (Failed Mission):
EC = VOL*FAT+CGSV+CPAYLOAD+CAMDEW+VOM
For a Recovered Vehicle (Failed Mission):
EC = CAMDEW+CREPAIRS+VOM
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Using the probabilities and expected costs, the decision tree can be solved.
Figure 11 shows a solved decision tree using the base case inputs. For the base case, one
can see that although the projected cost of the AMDEW system is $150M, the expected
equivalent cost of employing the system ($180.7M) is significantly less than the expected
equivalent cost of not employing the system ($408.7M).
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Figure 11: Solved Decision Tree

In order to ensure the decision maker’s choice is clear, it is necessary to perform
sensitivity analysis on all of the factors used in the decision. Given that the range of the
decision inputs is appropriate, sensitivity analysis should illuminate those inputs that
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0
825.32

0
755

most affect the outcome. The complete analysis is displayed in Appendix A at the end of
this document, but the tornado diagram (Figure 12) gives a fair overview of the effect
each variable has on the decision. The most significant factors are clearly the Mission
Value, AMDEW Effectiveness, Deterrence Effect, Probability of a Hit, the effectiveness
of Countermeasures (not AMDEW), and the Probability of an IADs launch. All other
factors, including the cost of the GSV, have no effect on the decision. The individual
sensitivity analysis for each variable (Appendix A) paints an even clearer picture, as only
one variable (Mission Value) affects the recommended decision (Figure 13). None of the
other variables, when projected across the entire plausible range of values, drives the
decision.

This is particularly interesting since the ranges for each variable were

specifically selected to represent a conservatively wide range of values. Based on the
sensitivity analysis, there is really only one decision point. If the Mission Value is more
than $267M ($483M less than the base case) then the AMDEW should not be purchased.
Otherwise, it appears to be a good investment.
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Tornado Diagram for EMV
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Figure 12: Tornado Diagram
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Figure 13: Sensitivity to Mission Value

To illuminate the decision further, it may be useful to view a risk profile (Figure
14) that visually displays the probability and severity for each consequence. Because of
the relatively high probability of extreme consequences only the most risk seeking
decision maker would choose to go without the AMDEW system.
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Figure 14: Consequence Probability vs. Expected Equivalent Cost

As a final check it is useful to conduct a two-way sensitivity analysis on the two
most influential factors – Mission Value and AMDEW effectiveness. As expected,
Figures 15 shows that the value of the mission is still the driving factor. However, a
downshift in AMDEW effectiveness can move the decision point slightly—requiring a
higher equivalent monetary value for the mission. The equation for the decision point is

⎡142.3 − 23.2 ( AMDEW effectiveness ) ⎤⎦
Value of Mission ≥ ⎣
⎡⎣0.1 − 0.4 ( AMDEW effectiveness ) ⎤⎦
If the equation above is satisfied then the AMDEW is a good investment.
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Figure 15: Two-Way Analysis of Mission Value and AMDEW Effectiveness

By choosing a technology that affects the likelihood of multiple scenarios the risk
conscious decision maker can significantly shift the risk portfolio toward the left. To
examine the aggregate impact of employing an effective AMDEW system, the risk
matrix could be modified to show the shift across several scenarios (Table 22). While it
may not necessarily shift the likelihood to a less severe category, it is clear (in the case of
the AMDEW system) that movement occurs in a positive direction in 50% of the threat
scenarios.
By making additional adjustments in the way of consequence mitigation (e.g.,
EMP hardening), the decision maker could also potentially reduce the expected
consequences and shift the scenario in to a less severe outcome category. This type of
shift analysis could be useful in helping determine which mix of likelihood/consequence
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mitigation measures provides the most impact for the least effort—though cost is not
explicitly displayed.
Table 22: Modified Risk Matrix

Very Low
Catastrophic
S11new

Critical

Low

Moderate

High

S12

S13new

S1 S13 S23

S11

S14new

S10 S14

S15new

S15

Serious

Very High

Moderate
Marginal

In a similar way, a more complex decision tree could be constructed to account
for more than one variable. The advantage being that the, decision maker could consider
expected equivalent costs at the same time he is considering different mitigation
measures.

To illustrate the concept, the consequence mitigation measure “EMP

Hardening” can be added to the analysis. This requires the additional variables of “EMP
Hardening Effectiveness” and “EMP Hardening Cost.” The effectiveness will range from
10% to 80%, with 60% as the base case. The cost will range from 10% of the GSV unit
cost to 50% of the GSV cost, with 25% as the base case.
Figures 16 and 17 below show the likelihood mitigation measure of an AMDEW
system being considered as well as the consequence mitigation measure of EMP
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Hardening. Somewhat surprisingly, the EMV calculation still favors the AMDEW-only
approach, and centers on Mission Value as the most influential factor.
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Figure 16: Multi-Criteria Decision Tree
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4.5.

Summary
Working on “future prediction” projects is inherently a struggle with uncertainty.

Even the most experienced planners, futurist and subject matter experts will likely
present wide-ranging opinions on most topics of interest.

The challenge to R&D

organizations is to bracket the future with a wide enough margin to include all plausible
scenarios, but not so wide as to entertain ambiguity. This analysis has demonstrated that
relatively straight-forward techniques (Decision Trees, and Sensitivity Analysis) can be
useful in focusing the decision makers on the elements that matter most to future weapon
systems.
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5. Conclusions
The purpose of this research was to help generate useful threat scenarios to aid
decision makers in planning for the defensive systems of the Global Strike Vehicle that
will operate through 2035. It should be clearly noted that this research product was
designed as an example of one process to achieve those aims. It is not a technical report
on advanced technologies, nor is it intended to be a definitive prediction of future
technologies or the world geopolitical situation. Those goals are well beyond the scope
of this effort. Instead this research employed credible processes (Risk Filtering Ranking
and Management, Decision Trees, and Sensitivity Analysis) to evaluate possible
scenarios, which were generated through a reasonable synthesis of credible, relevant
future studies and technology assessments conducted by recognized experts and
professionals in their fields. Additionally, all of the reports and data used in this research
are explicitly from open sources. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the decision
makers for any future Air Force development project would still need to access the most
current, detailed, classified information on threat systems available.

Such information

could easily be used to add scenarios, modify the likelihood and consequence ratings of
specific scenarios, adjust the cost ranges, and generally provide a greater degree of
confidence in the final result. Employing actual parameters of current weapon systems
(operational-based data and cost-based data) may also allow planners to predict
thresholds at which emerging technologies would compromise current systems.
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5.1.

Recommendations for Strike System Planners
The RFRM method seems to be an excellent approach for exploring and

organizing threats to Air Force assets. While it is true that the data used in this study
were open source and, perhaps, not detailed enough for making binding program
decisions, it is also true that it has generated some reasonable starting points for more
detailed exploration. Of particular note is the concept of non-nuclear Electomagnetic
Pulse (EMP) weapons that could derail a strike mission without relying on the precise
targeting capabilities required by directed energy and kinetic weapons. The potential for
probable adversaries to reduce the effectiveness of today’s stealth technologies also
seems highly likely. While pinpoint tracking and targeting of stealth vehicles may not be
realized, it may not be necessary for enemy systems to be that good. Simple detection of
a hostile (U.S.) air vehicle in the defender’s air space may give enough information to
partially damage or disable the vehicle and make it vulnerable to less advanced, but still
effective aircraft kill systems.
At the very least, the approaches explored in this research should provide decision
makers with a method for incorporating formal studies, Red Team exercises and
additional research into a coherent decision structure that can be evaluated and adjusted
over time.

5.2.

Recommendations for Future Research
This research, while useful as a foundation (or at least as a methodology template)

requires much greater technical granularity to enable a true quantitative analysis that
could lead to program-level design decisions. That level of detail will undoubtedly
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require access to classified data and classified expert assessments to attain operational
quality decision making. Additional research would also be appropriate (as separate
projects) to develop more detailed capabilities projections on each of the three major
threat areas of EMP, Directed Energy Weapons (DEW), and Advanced Detection
Systems. Additional research also seems needed in the area of quantifying the value of a
strike mission so that it can be properly considered in any risk management plan.

5.3.

Final Summary
The goal of this research was to add to the body of knowledge.

It clearly

demonstrated the utility of the RFRM process as a useful tool for developing risk
scenarios.

It demonstrated that using existing studies and open source technical

evaluations can be useful in establishing a general threat framework. And it showed how
employing future studies in concert with technology projections in a transparent process
can help constrain an open-ended, speculative design question to a framework of
reasonable propositions and rational operational scenarios to help guide the systems
engineering effort.
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